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INTRODUCTION

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first in a series of modern congressional enactments designed to provide citizens an effective means of vindicating their civil rights in the courts.' At
the time of its passage, Congress was concerned that certain
provisions of the Act would prove difficult to enforce. 2 In an effort to encourage private citizens to aid in the enforcement of
Titles II and VII of the Act, Congress included a "fee shifting"
mechanism as an enforcement provision. 3 The "fee shifting"
mechanism grants courts power to reallocate or "shift" the liability for attorneys' fees incurred by a prevailing litigant to his
unsuccessful adversary. It was hoped that these fee shifting
provisions would remove the high cost of litigation barrier to the
4
prosecution of meritorious Title II and Title VII claims.
In the early 1970's, federal courts began to assert an equitable power to award attorneys' fees to successful civil rights litigants. 5 The courts based these awards on what was termed the
"private attorney general" doctrine, because they were granted
to parties who had acted in the capacity of private attorneys
1. Now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (1978).
2. The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing the legislative history of the Act, observed, "When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it
was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation
would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing
broad compliance with the law." Newman v. Piggie Park Ent., 390 U.S. 400,
401 (1968).
3. The sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which provide for awards
of attorneys' fees are 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1978) (Title II, housing discrimination) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1978) (Title VII, employment discrimination). The clauses which permit fee shifting under Title II and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are identical. Those sections provide that in
any action brought under those Titles, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ....

a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the

costs." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1978) (Title II); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1978)
(Title VII).
4. When explaining an amendment which added a "fee shifting" provision to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Humphrey noted
that such provision "should make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to
bring a meritorious suit [under Title VIII." 110 CONG. REC. 12,724 (1964).
5. The Fourth Circuit was apparently the first court of appeals to sanction such awards. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 933 (1972) (parties who successfully prosecuted school desegregation case held entitled to award of fees from defendant school board).
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general in vindicating the public interest. 6 The private attorney
6. The use of the private attorney general doctrine arose as an extension of the "equitable fund doctrine." The courts have traditionally been
empowered under this doctrine to grant an award of attorneys' fees to successful parties in certain limited situations. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939). One of these situations, known as the "common
fund doctrine," became operative when a litigant, through prosecution of
his private lawsuit, established a "common fund" to which an identifiable
class of beneficiaries was entitled. The theory underlying this doctrine was
that those who were to share the benefits of a private party's litigation
should also share in the costs incident to the creation of the fund. Id. at 166.
This doctrine was extended by the United States Supreme Court in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills involved a stockholders derivative action to set aside a corporate merger. In Mills, the
Court awarded the prevailing plaintiffs an allowance for attorneys' fees, to
be paid out of corporate funds. This award was made notwithstanding the
Court's recognition that the suit had not produced the type of "common
fund" from which fees were traditionally recovered. Id. at 392. Rather, the
Mills Court held that the stockholders had received a "substantial benefit"
through the plaintiff's efforts to set aside the corporate merger. Such "benefit" was held to be appropriate grounds for the taxation of attorneys' fees
against the stockholder "beneficiaries" of the corporation. The Court
stated:
To award attorneys' fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who has succeeded
in establishing a cause of action is not to saddle the unsuccessful party
with the expenses but to impose them on the class that has benefited
from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit.
Id. at 396-97. Thus, the "common fund" doctrine was transformed into what
has been termed the "common benefit doctrine." See generally Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients In Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 849 (1975).
The "private attorney general" fee shifting doctrine arose as an extension of the Mills reasoning. The doctrine had its origin in private civil rights
litigation lodged against governmental defendants. Brewer v. School Bd.,
456 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). Federal courts
reasoned that because prosecution of civil rights litigation "vindicated a
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority," Newman v. Piggie
Park Ent., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), and because liability for the fee taxed
against the school board would eventually be borne by the parties who had
"benefited" from the litigation (to wit, local citizens who can benefit from an
integrated school system), a fee award was appropriate. See also Natural
Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) (fees
awarded under private attorney general doctrine to plaintiffs who forced
the EPA to comply with its obligations under the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5 et seq.).
Although this reasoning was criticized from the onset, see Brewer v.
School Bd., 456 F.2d at 945 (Winter, J., specially concurring), the doctrine
was expanded to authorize awards of attorneys' fees to be paid by private
defendants, where the plaintiff's lawsuit successfully vindicated important
congressional and public policies. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). By 1975, most federal circuits had recognized or
applied the private attorney general doctrine in order to encourage enforcement of civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Incarcerated Men of Allen County
Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1978));
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1978)); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1978));
Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972)
(school desegregation); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1978)); Rodriguez v. Trainor, 67 F.R.D. 437 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (So-
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general doctrine first arose as a law of standing, involving the
right of private parties to initiate suit on behalf of the "public's"
interest.7 The doctrine's extended application as a fee shifting
device enabled parties to bring suit to vindicate important pubto recover litigation costs
lic policies expressed by Congress and
8
adversaries.
unsuccessful
from their
The private attorney general doctrine complemented the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and supplementary legislation permit9
ting judicial fee shifting under selected civil rights statutes.
The comprehensive availability of "fee shifting," whether by
statute or through the private attorney general doctrine, helped
remove financial barriers which had formerly hindered private
vindication of civil rights.10
cial Security Act); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), a f'd mem.,

409 U.S. 942 (1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1978)); Gaddis v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp.
1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Social Security Act).
7. The use of the private attorney general doctrine as a rule of standing
became settled in the 1940's. The Second Circuit held that Congress can
confer authority on private parties to enforce federal statutes, even though
those parties could not demonstrate that they were "aggrieved" by the infirmity they sought to correct by private litigation. The court stated:
Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any nonofficial persons, authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer
in violation of his statutory powers; for then,. . . there is an actual con-

troversy, and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress
from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding
involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the
public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private
Attorney Generals.
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). Similarly, a party
who brought suit under a title in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have
"congressional authority" to act as a "private attorney general," for purposes of standing. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
§ 22.05 (1958).
8. Courts held that fees should ordinarily be granted to parties under

the private attorney general doctrine, unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 954 (4th
Cir.) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). Subsequent cases dealing with the
question stated this principle in even stronger terms. One circuit stated:
"[Wihen a litigant qualifies as a 'private attorney general' the award loses
much of its discretionary character and becomes a part of the effective remedy a court should fashion to encourage public minded suits .... and to
carry out congressional policy," Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885,
889 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.),
affid mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972)).
9. These enactments included: Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e)
(1976); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1973); Voting Rights
Amendment of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 l(e) (1978).
10. The statutes cited in note 9 supra did not establish "fee shifting" as
a comprehensive enforcement device in the bulk of the existing civil rights
laws. The private attorney general doctrine made this remedy available in
many of the important civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
1985, 1986 (1978), where the remedy was not provided for by statute.
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In 1975, however, the United States Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society," abolished the
use of the private attorney general doctrine as a fee shifting
mechanism. 12 Alyeska reiterated the established American rule
prohibiting courts from allocating the cost of attorneys' fees
among parties, in the absence of congressional approval. 13 The
Alyeska Court noted that congressional utilization of fee shifting provisions in specific civil rights statutes did not grant the
judiciary authority to "jettison the traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances [of attorneys' fees] to the prevailing
party."'1 4 Thus, after Alyeska, fee shifting was available only
under civil rights statutes which expressly authorized the proce15
dure.
It was in response to the Alyeska decision, and to the desire
16
of Congress "to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws,"'
that the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 was enacted. This
Act amended title 42 U.S.C. section 1988 by adding the following
provision:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977,
1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986], title IX of Public Law 92318 [20 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1681 et seq.], or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf
11. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
12. The Alyeska decision did not affect the use of the private attorney
general doctrine as a concept of standing. Indeed, the Supreme Court had
recently affirmed the use of the private attorney general standing doctrine,
according broad standing to persons injured under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1973). Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
13. The traditional rule in American jurisdictions was that courts were
not permitted to shift liability for attorneys' fees between parties to litigation, absent congressional approval. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
306 (1796). Congress has granted courts the authority to assess limited
costs among parties through the Fees and Costs statute, codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1920 (1977). The costs assessable under the statute do not include
liability for attorneys' fees.
The rationale behind the "American Rule," was that parties "should not
be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit," and that routine taxation of attorneys' fees in litigation would unjustly discourage the
poor "from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponent's counsel." Fleischmann Distill.
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
14. 421 U.S. at 263.
15. Those statutes comprised Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1978), and the statutes cited in note
9 supra.
16. The Senate Report on section 1988 declared: "The purpose of this
amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by
the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 5908, 5908.
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of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation
of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code 126
U.S.C.S. §§ 1 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42
U.S.C.S. §§ 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the
attorprevailing party, other than the
17 United States, a reasonable
ney's fee as part of the costs.
Section 1988, as amended, permits the judiciary to exercise the
type of discretion they utilized under the private attorney general doctrine to relieve parties who bring private suit to enforce
the civil rights laws, of the financial burden of litigation. 18
17. The Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, is codi-

fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1978).
18. Indeed, the standard which governs a court's discretion in granting
fee awards to successful civil rights litigants under section 1988 is identical
to the standard utilized under the private attorney general doctrine. The
Senate Report on section 1988 stated:
It is intended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the
same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party
seeking to enforce the rights protected by the statutes covered by S.
2278, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5908, 5912.

The Newman Court, in construing Title II lawsuits, noted that one who
had secured injunctive relief under that title "does so not for himself alone,
but also as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority." 390 U.S. at 402. Because Title II plaintiffs were furthering the public interest through their private lawsuit, the
Newman Court concluded that the fee award remedy under that title
should be liberally applied:
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.
Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees-not simply
to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to
be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.
Id. Compare this standard with the standards utilized by courts which applied the private attorney general doctrine, see note 8 supra.
"Circumstances" under which a court may deny an award of attorneys'
fees to prevailing plaintiffs under section 1988 fall under three broad categories. The first category includes those cases where the reprehensible conduct of the plaintiff, in connection with the litigation, led a court to deny the
fee request for equitable reasons. In Brown v. Stackler, 460 F. Supp. 446
(N.D. Ill. 1978), affd, No. 78-2503 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 1980), the district judge
declined to award fees entirely after the plaintiff submitted a fee request
which exaggerated the hours counsel spent on the case by 800%. That court
noted, however, that if the fee award request had been only "moderately
excessive," an award, based on reduced hours as determined by the judge,
may have been granted. 460 F. Supp. at 447. For cases which follow the
latter approach, see notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra. See also Castleberry v. Langford, 428 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (where plaintiff's "abrasive and surly" character and the unreasonable nature in which he
presented his grievances to his employer led to his being fired, albeit in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1978)); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517
F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975) (union, which was real party in interest in Title VII
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Nonprofit legal services organizations, as well as attorneys
in private practice, are entitled to awards of reasonable attorlitigation, was refused reimbursement for legal services provided individual
plaintiffs in private suit, where the object of the suit was to circumvent a
valid agreement between the union and the defendant airline).
The second category of cases in which a judge, in his discretion, may
decline to award fees to prevailing plaintiffs under section 1988 are those
where the right vindicated by the prevailing plaintiff was insignificant.
Thus, in Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977),
plaintiff was denied section 1988 fees after he successfully overturned an
ancient, seldom enforced local curfew ordinance. Noting that the relief obtained in the suit did not "rise to the level of national priority or constitutional dimension which warranted the award of fees in Newman," the court
declined to award fees to plaintiff. Id. at 1370. Similarly, in Zarcone v.
Perry, 438 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 843 (1979), the district court declined to award counsel
fees under section 1988 where plaintiff's lawsuit did not vindicate the interests of the public or an identifiable class, 438 F. Supp. at 791, and the plaintiff's claim was merely a tort claim couched in terms of due process
violations. Id. at 790. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
noting that the Newman rule was "not to be applied woodenly without consideration of the underlying factors which generated it." 581 F.2d at 1044.
The Second Circuit observed:
[T] he principal factor to be considered by the trial judge in exercising
his discretion is whether a person in the plaintiff's position would have
been deterred or inhibited from seeking to enforce civil rights [under
section 1988] without an assurance that his attorneys' fees would be
paid if he were successful.
Id. The Second Circuit believed that the petitioner in Newman, who had
brought suit for injunctive relief under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1978), had met this standard. 581 F.2d at 1044. In
contrast, the court observed that the petitioner in Zarcone had sought and
obtained $141,000 in damages, including $61,000 in punitive damages; and
the injury sued for was in the nature of a private one unlikely to recur. Id.
Under these facts, the Second Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a section 1988 fee award to petitioner. Id. at
1045; accord, Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979).
A third category of cases in which courts have denied section 1988 fee
requests arises where the civil rights violation arose from the good faith
efforts of the defendants to comply with a "murky" area of the law, rather
than from intentional racial or sex discrimination. See Henderson v. Fort
Worth Ind. School Dist., 574 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.), affid by an equally divided
court en banc, opinion vacated, 584 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978). In Henderson, a
school district "qualified voter" requirement, which did not discriminate on
the basis of race or sex, was mandated by state law. The defendants had no
power to alter the procedure. Even though the plaintiffs successfully overturned the statute, the court declined to award fees to the plaintiff because
of the factors listed above and because the financial burden of the fee award
would fall on "people who had participated in no discriminatory act." 574
F.2d at 1213. See also Chastang v. Flynn &Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir.
1976) (fee request in Title VII suit denied where defendant-employer's actions were mandated by state law, defendant lacked power to alter his conduct, defendant had no economic incentive to discriminate, fee award
would injure innocent benefits-plan participants, and defendant quickly
corrected the constitutional infirmity once the law was clarified). Contra,
Criterion Club of Albany v. Board of Comm'rs, 594 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir.
1979) (held improper to deny section 1988 fees to successful petitioner on
grounds that burden of fee award would fall upon innocent taxpayers who
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neys' fees under section 1988. The legislative history of section
198819 and the overwhelming weight of judicial authority construing it 20 indicate that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to an
award of attorneys' fees even though their counsel did not exact
21
Howa fee or was employed by a legal services organization.
ever, the extent of the entitlement of counsel to fees, and the
did not institute the discriminatory election system enacted 20 years before
suit was brought).
Cf. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 1979)
(§ 1988). In Northcross, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in dicta
that "[i]n some circumstances, it would be unfair to award fees against defendants who entered the suit principally as amici curiae to give the court
another perspective on the issues involved." 611 F.2d at 635. The court did
not delineate the circumstances under which such an award against amici
would be "unfair."
19. The House Report of section 1988 stated in a footnote that "a prevailing party is entitled to counsel fees even if represented by an organization
or if the party is itself an organization." H. R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 n.16 (1976). That passage in the report approvingly cited Torres v.
Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976). Torres,
a Voting Rights Act case (42 U.S.C. § 1973 l(e) (1978), upheld an award of
counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff who had been represented by a federally funded legal services organization.
20. See, e.g., Lund v. Affieck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978) (federally funded
legal services organization entitled to section 1988 award); Mid-Hudson Legal Serv., Inc. v. G &U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1978) (federally funded legal
services organization entitled to section 1988 award); McManama v.
Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Va. 1978) (federally funded legal services
organization entitled to section 1988 award); NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp.
1164 (D.D.C. 1978) (plaintiff civil rights organization entitled to section 1988
award); White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (publicly funded legal services organization entitled to section 1988 award); Alsager v. District
Ct. of Polk County, 447 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (ACLU affiliate counsel
entitled to section 1988 award); Card v. Dempsey, 445 F. Supp. 942 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (federally funded legal services organization entitled to section
1988 award); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977)
(public interest litigation group attorney, working on pro bono publico basis, entitled to section 1988 award); Schmidt v. Schubert, 433 F. Supp. 1115
(E.D. Wis. 1977) (legal service organization elititled to section 1988 award).
See also Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (approved section
1988 fee to court appointed counsel).
21. Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974), cited with approval
in H. R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 n.16 (1976). The Fairley court
stated in no uncertain terms that "allowable fees and expenses may not be
reduced because [plaintiff's] attorney was employed or funded by a civil
rights organization and/or tax exempt foundation or because the attorney
does not exact a fee." 493 F.2d at 606. As a cautionary note, however, it
must be observed that this language does not necessarily indicate that a fee
award to organizational counsel may never be less than an award to private
counsel. The issue before the Fairleycourt was whether an award to organizational counsel could be arbitrarilyreduced in amount solely on the basis
of the organizational status of counsel. Id. Fairley does not hold that a
reasonable fee to organizational counsel which happens to be smaller than
a fee granted to large private firms would be prohibited. See notes 318-35
infra for a discussion of all cases cited in the Senate and House Reports of
section 1988 which address the entitlement of organizational counsel to judicial awards of attorneys' fees.
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such awards should be determined, are far
manner in which
2
from settled.

2

This article will examine the procedures employed by
courts in determining the size of a "reasonable" award of attorneys' fees under section 1988. Thus, it will be assumed for purposes of this comment that the party seeking the award is a
plaintiff;23 that such party has prevailed in the overall litigation;24 that doctrines of immunity do not bar the award of fees
22. Compare NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978) (NAACP
staff counsel awarded fee of $100 per hour) with Alsager v. District Ct. of
Polk County, 447 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (fee awarded legal services
organization staff counsel keyed to their salaries, resulting in hourly rate of
$35 per hour). The fee award rates at which private attorneys are compensated are similarly diverse. Compare Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d
624 (6th Cir. 1979) (§ 1988 case, lead counsel awarded $137.50 per hour for incourt work, $82.50 per hour for out-of-court work) with Meisel v. Kremens,
80 F.R.D. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (§ 1988 case, lead counsel awarded $60 per hour
overall for his litigation work). See note 234 infra for a table listing fee recovery rates in 56 civil rights cases dating from 1974 to the present.
23. Successful plaintiffs should "ordinarily" recover an award of attorneys' fees under section 1988, "unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie
Park Ent., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). See note 18 supra for a discussion of this
standard.
In contrast, defendants who prevail under section 1988 receive attorneys' fees awards only when the plaintiff's lawsuit "was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . . the plaintiff continued to litigate after it
clearly became so." Lopez v. Aransas County Ind.School Dist., 570 F.2d 541,
545 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 422 (1978) (Title VII)). Such awards to prevailing defendants serve to
"discourage baseless or frivolous actions" under section 1988, Carrion v.
Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976) (Title VII), and are not
necessarily designed to make prevailing defendants whole. Id. at 728. Consequently, the procedures and factors utilized by courts to set the size of a
reasonable award of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs are not always
observed by courts awarding fees to prevailing defendants. See generally
Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judicial Response To The Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Act, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 243, 253-58 (1978). The scope of this article is
limited to a discussion of standards governing fee awards to plaintiffs, with
the caveat that such standards may or may not be considered by courts
awarding fees to prevailing defendants.
24. Section 1988 provides that prevailing litigants may be entitled to an
award of attorneys' fees under that section. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1978). The
actual receipt of a favorable judgment, however, is not an essential prerequisite to such an award. The Senate Report on section 1988 provides that
"parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights
through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief." S. REP.
No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5912. Some courts note that if a plaintiff obtains through settlement "some of the benefits" for which suit was brought, such plaintiff will
be considered a prevailing party for purposes of section 1988 if the suit
"would have survived a motion to dismiss." Mental Patient Civil Lib. v.
Hospital Staff Civil Rights Comm., 444 F. Supp. 981 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
Fourth Circuit has suggested that courts should take a pragmatic "factual/legal" approach to determine whether the "plaintiff-fee claimant's ef-
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against the defendant; 25 and that section 1988 can be applied to

26
the substantive litigation giving rise to the fee award request.

forts contributed in a significant way" to the outcome of the settlement.
Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979).
Although a plaintiff may recover a section 1988 award if he succeeds "on
any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing suit," Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79
(1st Cir. 1978), some federal circuits hold that such parties may only receive
compensation for work done on issues on which the plaintiff "prevailed."
Id. at 279; accord, Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1027 (5th Cir. 1979).
Another line of cases holds that partially successful plaintiffs should
receive section 1988 fees for work done on any issues "reasonably calculated to advance a client's interests," notwithstanding the fact that such
claims "did not provide the precise basis for the relief granted." Brown v.
Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1978). The Sixth Circuit recently noted:
The fact that some of that time was spent in pursuing issues on research which was ultimately unproductive, rejected by the court, or
mooted by intervening events is wholly irrelevant. So long as the party
has prevailed on the case as a whole the district courts are to allow
compensation for hours expended on unsuccessful research or litigation, unless the positions asserted are frivolous or in bad faith.
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979) (Q 1988). The
United States Supreme Court has yet to resolve this issue. In any event,
the issue of whether a litigant is a "prevailing party" may affect the gross
size of an attorney's fee award. But such considerations are not relevant to
the determination of a "reasonable" hourly rate to be awarded an attorney
under section 1988. Therefore, this area of controversy in section 1988 litigation will not be discussed further in this article. For authority which discusses the issue in greater depth, see Lipson, supra note 23, at 258-61.
25. Most courts have rejected eleventh amendment challenges to
awards of section 1988 fees levied against state governmental units. See,
e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). See generally Lipson, supra note
23, at 261-69. However, some states still attempt to challenge such fee
awards. See Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.
Ct. 44 (1979) (certiorari granted to determine whether a federal court which
enters judgment for plaintiff on state statutory ground while abstaining on
federal constitutional issues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1978), is barred by eleventh amendment from awarding a section 1988 fee to plaintiff, to be paid out
of funds in state treasury). This eleventh amendment issue is addressed to
entitlement to section 1988 fees-not to the determination of the reasonable
size of such fees. Therefore, this issue will not receive further discussion
herein.
26. A party must bring suit under certain substantive federal laws to be
entitled to a section 1988 fee. These substantive laws include 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986, 2000d et seq. (1976); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (1976);
and 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1974). For a more detailed description of the coverage of section 1988, see generally Lipson, supra note 23, at 245-46. Additionally, a question may arise with regard to whether section 1988 can be
applied to litigation commenced prior to passage of that Act. Generally,
section 1988 applies retroactively to all cases pending on the date it was
enacted. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 1979)
(section 1988 applied to litigation dating from 1968, when the case became
active following a United States Supreme Court decision); Bond v. Stanton,
555 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). Thus, the
issue of retroactivity has not been presented in recently commenced litigation. For a discussion of the applicability of section 1988 to pending cases,
see generally Lipson, supra note 23, at 250-53.
The issues discussed above involve the entitlement of a litigant to sec-
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Assuming that these preliminary matters are disposed of, this
comment should aid the practitioner in the final, and perhaps
most complex step of the fee determination process: litigation
of the size of the financial recovery by prevailing counsel, and
the corresponding liability of the unsuccessful litigant for a judicial award of attorneys' fees under section 1988.
REASONABLE ATTORNEYs' FEE AWARDS

In general, a judicial award of "reasonable" attorneys' fees
under section 1988 should be "adequate to attract competent
counsel," without producing "windfalls to attorneys. '27 The legislative history of section 1988 does not specify how large such
awards should be. Congress left that determination to the discretion of the courts. 28 Congress did, however, provide some
guidance with regard to the procedure by which a court should
determine the size of a "reasonable" fee. Both the House and
Senate reports on section 1988 cite the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.29 as a case applying
"appropriate standards" to the determination of a judicial award
30
of attorneys' fees.
At the time of the passage of section 1988, the Johnson case
had already become a landmark decision in the law governing
attorneys' fee awards. Prior to Johnson, district courts had not
made a practice of elucidating the basis for their attorneys' fee
award determinations. 31 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir32
cuit reviewed such a fee award determination in Johnson.
The district court, without explanation, had awarded plaintion 1988 fees, as opposed to the reasonable size of such fee awards. Thus,

further discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this article.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
28. Section 1988 provides that a court, in its discretion may award pre-

vailing parties with awards of counsel fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1978). Accordingly, Congress did not delineate any payment scales for such awards, as
was done under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1979).
29. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1978), Title VII
litigation).
30. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976); S.REP. No. 1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 5908,

5913.
31. One commentator surveyed the district court opinions in volumes
384-94 of the Federal Supplement (1974-75). Of the 28 reported cases involving a fee determination, thirteen cases contained "absolutely no articulated

reason for the amount [of attorneys' fees] awarded." See Berger, Court
Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?,126 U. PA. L. REV. 281
(1977).
32. The plaintiff's counsel in Johnson had successfully prosecuted a Title VII class action and claimed fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1978) of
that title. 488 F.2d at 715.
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tiff's counsel less than half the attorneys' fees requested. 33 It
discounted a significant number of the hours claimed to have
been expended in the litigation. The remaining hours were com34
pensated at an hourly rate well below local market levels.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that the lower court's failure to set forth in the record its reasons for awarding a reduced
fee effectively precluded meaningful appellate review of the adequacy of the fee awarded. 35 The court did not express an opinion as to whether the actual fee awarded by the district court
was appropriate. 36 Instead, the court of appeals enunciated a series of twelve factors and remanded the cause, instructing the
district court to reconsider its fee award in light of those factors.3 7 The factors included: (1) the time and labor required; (2)
the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite
to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)
the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8)
the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 38
Eight of the twelve factors listed in the Johnson opinion
were drawn verbatim from the American Bar Association Code
of Professional Responsibility. 39 In effect, the court of appeals
ordered the district court to consider the same general stan33. Plaintiff's counsel requested a total fee of $30,145.50, for the rendition of 659.9 hours of legal services. The district court set the size of the fee
award at $13,500, less than half the amount requested. 488 F.2d at 715.
34. The court of appeals noted that the fee rate awarded counsel by the
district court, of between $28 and $33 per hour, was below the minimum fee
scales for that jurisdiction. Id. at 717.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 720.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 717-19.
39. After setting forth the twelve factors, the court of appeals noted that
they "were consistent" with those recommended by the A.B.A. rules. In
fact, many of the twelve factors are identical to the guidelines set forth by
the A.B.A. Those guidelines provide:
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that

the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as

guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly.
2)

The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the

particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
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dards which influence the size of attorneys' fees billed by private practitioners in the open market. 40 It did not intend that
these factors be used to "reduce the calculation of a reasonable
fee to mathematical precision. ' 41 The factors were presented to
aid district courts in their efforts to award fees adequate to enVII, without producing a
courage private enforcement of Title
42
windfall to the successful attorney.
The court of appeals also outlined procedural rules to accompany utilization of the twelve Johnson factors. Initially, the
court noted that it is plaintiff's counsel who bears the burden of
establishing his entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees. 43 Attorneys are obligated to submit detailed time records to the district court, delineating the time expended on specific tasks in
the litigation." Without such information, the trial judge has no
45
evidentiary basis on which to apply the Johnson factors.
The fee customarily charged in the locality for simliar legal services.
4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
3)

6)

The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

7)
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIB1LITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Ethical Consideration 2-18, Disciplinary Rule 2-106 (B). The Fifth Circuit in Johnson added but two considerations to this list. The twelveth
factor, "awards in similar cases" can be encompassed by the third A.B.A.
factor, "the customary fee." The tenth Johnson factor, "the undesirability of
the case," is not mentioned in the A.B.A. rules.
40. To the extent that private attorneys follow the American Bar Association guidelines set forth in note 39 supra, a trial court would consider the
same factors and utilize the same weighing process as private attorneys
should do, when they set their fees in the open market.
41. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir.
1974).
42. The Johnson court noted that "courts do not have a mandate under
[Title VII] to make the prevailing counsel rich." Id. at 719. Additionally,
the court of appeals recognized that Title VII fee awards should not be "implemented in such a manner to make the private attorney general's position
so lucrative as to ridicule the public attorney general." Id.
43. The Johnson court noted that "the plaintiff has the burden of proving his entitlement to an award for attorneys' fees just as he would bear the
burden of proving a claim for any other money judgment." Id. at 720.
44. The fee seeking attorney bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees. Accordingly, courts have held that
prevailing counsel must specifically establish the total time expended on
various litigation tasks. See King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Lockheed Min.Sol. Coal. v. Lockheed
Missles & Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Title VII).
45. The courts require such information, because they determine the
gross amount of a fee award by attaching a dollar/hour value to the services
rendered by an attorney, which is then multiplied by the total number of
compensable hours expended on the litigation. A court cannot make this
calculation without information, submitted by the attorney, regarding the
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In addition, a number of procedural requirements govern
consideration of the Johnson factors by district courts. Although the issue was not before the Fifth Circuit in Johnson,
other decisions have required lower courts to hold evidentiary
hearings on the applicability of the Johnson factors to an individual case. 46 These hearings permit litigants to state their
views on the applicability of each Johnson factor to their own
performance in the litigation thereby preserving their views in
47
the record.
In addition, trial courts are required to elucidate of record
their findings of fact on each individual Johnson factor. 48 This
requirement assures a reviewing court that the trial judge has
"considered" the individual factors in his fee award determination.4 9 These procedures provide the basis on which appellate
courts review the factual findings of a trial judge. A trial court's
failure to adhere to these procedures constitutes an abuse of
discretion. 50
All federal circuits have applied the twelve Johnson factors
when determining judicial fee awards under section 1988.51 In
time spent in litigating the case. See Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244
(D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated, 48 U.S.L.W. 2017 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1979) (rehearing en banc granted).
46. The district court in Johnson did hold such a hearing on the question of attorneys' fees, thus, the issue was not before the court of appeals in
Johnson. Nonetheless, such hearings should be provided by district courts.
The United States Supreme Court in Perkins v. StandardOil Co., suggested
that "[tihe amount of [an award of attorneys' fees] for such services
should, be fixed in the first instance by the District Court, after hearing evidence as to the extent and nature of the services rendered." 399 U.S. 222, 223
(1970) (antitrust action under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1975)); accord, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 468 (2d Cir. 1974); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240 (1975); Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1973).
47. The issue of entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees is generally
briefed by the parties. Courts of appeals, as well as the trial court, have the
benefit of these briefs in their fee award determinations.
48. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720. See
also cases cited in note 247 infra.
49. Id. See also King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
50. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.

1974).
51. Section 1988 cases citing the Johnson factors include: Hampton v.
Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 643 (7th Cir. 1979); Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 782
(10th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1978); Fountila v.
Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 496 (9th Cir. 1978); Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551
F.2d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Snyder, 470 F. Supp. 972, 974 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 735 (D.R.I. 1979); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 466 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Iowa 1979);
Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 43 (S.D. Fla. 1979); McManama v.
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addition, Johnson continues to be the leading case governing
other statutory and equitable mechanisms permitting federal
courts to award attorneys' fees to successful litigants.5 2 Despite
its universal acceptance, however, the manner in which Johnson
has been applied seems to vary among judges. The differing proLukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38,43 (W.D. Va. 1978); Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp.
496, 502 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 620 (S.D.
Ala. 1978); NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (D.D.C. 1978); White v.
Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp.
1274, 1281 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 809, 813 (D.
Minn. 1977).
52. Johnson involved a fee award determination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1978)). For other Title VII
cases following Johnson, see, e.g., Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 588
F.2d 235, 242 (8th Cir. 1978); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Morehead v. Lewis, 432 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 690 (S.D. Tex. 1976), affid, 577
F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F.
Supp. 743, 791 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th

Cir. 1977); Lockheed Min. Sol. Coal. v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 406 F.
Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F. Supp. 1201,
1203 (E.D. La. 1974); Davis v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9444
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
Courts which have followed Johnson while awarding fees under various
federal statutes include: Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 938 (5th Cir.
1978), opinion after remandfrom, East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1973 l(e) (1978), Voting Rights Act);
Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappij Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1281 n.10
(5th Cir. 1978) (33 U.S.C.S. § 928 (Supp. 1979), Longshoreman's & Harbor
Workers Comp. Act); Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721, 725 n.6
(8th Cir. 1978) (15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1976), Motor Vehicle Information & Cost
Savings Act); Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978) (15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976), Truth In Lending
Act); Walston v. School Bd. of City of Suffolk, 566 F.2d 1201, 1204 (4th Cir.
1977) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act); Kerr v. Screen Extras
Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976)
(29 U.S.C. § 529, § 501(b) (1975), Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure
Act); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 450 F. Supp. 507, 511 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1975), Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967);
Smith v. Chapman, 436 F. Supp. 58, 66 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a) (3) (1976), Truth In Lending Act); Computer Statistics, Inc. v.
Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1975), Antitrust); Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F. Supp. 133, 141-42 (N.D. Miss. 1976), affd,
581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976)); Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator Chem. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 522, 524 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1975),
Clayton Act); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 411
(D. Md. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975)
(20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976)).
Courts which have awarded counsel fees under equitable doctrines include: Central Soya Co. v. Cox Towing Corp., 431 F. Supp. 502, 506 (N.D.
Miss. 1977) (maritime lien); Matter of Imperial '400' Nat'l, Inc., 431 F. Supp..
155, 160 (D.N.J. 1977) (Chapter X reorganization proceeding).
Cases employing the private attorney general doctrine as a fee shifting
mechanism, which cited Johnson, included: Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d
598, 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Ext. Serv., 378 F. Supp.
1251, 1255 (N.D. Miss. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.
1976).
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cedural approaches to the Johnson factors present but one
problem currently being grappled with.53 Initially, it should be
noted that the courts have construed the nature of the individual Johnson factors in differing, and often irreconcilable, ways.
The Johnson factors have been utilized by the courts whenever a statute or the court's equitable powers have permitted
them to grant attorneys' fees to successful litigants.5 4 Accordingly, a great deal of case law has developed construing each factor. Use of the factors must pertain specifically to the individual
attorney claiming fees.5 5 The underlying cause of action, be it
bankruptcy, antitrust, multidistrict class actions, or civil rights
litigation, should not affect the manner in which the Johnson
factors are interpreted and applied.5 6 Thus, the extensive body
of law pertaining to the use of the Johnson factors will be set
forth.
SYNTHESIS OF THE JOHNSON FACTORS

Time and Labor Required
The starting point for determining a reasonable fee under
Johnson is an examination of the hours expended on the case
by the successful attorney. 57 The trial judge should weigh the
hours claimed by prevailing counsel "against his own
knowledge, experience and expertise of the time required to
complete similar activities. '5 8 This weighing process should
separate claimed hours validly spent in litigation, from time unnecessarily, duplicitously, or excessively claimed.5 9 In this un60
dertaking, a judge need not rely on independent testimony.
Initially, a trial judge will trim from a time claim what he
believes to be excessive hours. Some trial courts have disallowed up to half the hours claimed by an attorney when the litigation involved relatively simple issues, the case was not
53. See the section of this article entitled "PROCEDURAL APPLICATIONS

OF THE JOHNSON FACTORS," beginning on page 376 infra.
54. See notes 51-52 supra.
55. These factors remain constant regardless of the underlying statutory provision upon which suit is brought.
56. See note 52 supra.
57. Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 690 (S.D. Tex. 1976),
affid, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title VII).

58. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir.
1974).

59. Id.
60. Trial judges are considered experts on the issue of determining the
amount of time which should reasonably be expended on a lawsuit. See,
e.g., Davis v. Board of Comm'rs of Mobile County, 526 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir.
1976) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act); Morehead v. Lewis, 432
F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (Title VII).
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complex, and the governing law was clear. 61 Other courts, unsure of the exact number of excessive hours claimed, have simply reduced the final fee award on an arbitrary, percentage
basis. 62 When hourly claims are "incredibly" excessive, courts
have not hesitated to disallow a significant portion of the
claimed hours. 63 Time claims which appear excessive when
compared with fee claims of co-counsel have also been reduced
by the courts. 64 Similarly, a fee claim may be reduced when it
claims in different lawappears excessive in relation to similar
65
suits recently heard by that judge.
Another form of an "excessive" fee claim arises when a
number of attorneys request fees for the performance of the
same or similar services. The Johnson court cautioned that
61. Gagne v. Maher, 455 F. Supp. 1344, 1349 (D. Conn.), rev'd on other
grounds, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979) (50.%
reduction in hours claimed in § 1983 class action challenging manner in
which A.F.D.C. benefits were calculated in violation of A.F.D.C. regulations); Pace v. Califano, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7547 (D.D.C. 1977) (Title VII)
(99 hours spent on memo in opposition to motion to dismiss and 52.25 hours
spent on memo in opposition to renewed motion to dismiss were excessive;
court disallowed compensation for 50% of those hours).
62. Barrett v. Kalinowski, 458 F. Supp. 689 (M.D. Pa. 1978). In Barrett,
the court heard evidence that work done by plaintiffs counsel could have
2
been accomplished in A of the time claimed. Id. at 706. Because the record
did not disclose the specific degree of excessiveness, the court reduced the
final fee award by 25%. Id. at 708.
63. Cole v. Tuttle, 462 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Miss. 1978). In Cole, the court
held that 200 hours expended in preparation for a one-day trial was clearly
excessive. The court disallowed 50% of the out-of-court hours. Id. at 1020.
See also Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (class securities litigation; award of fees made under equitable fund doctrine)
(claim of 280 hours for reviewing record at pre-trial stage, briefing and arguing interlocutory matter, held excessive; fee reduced to 15% of recovery,
from 33% request; total recovery being $425,000, and total hours claimed being 1,845).
9167 (D. Colo. 1979) (Title
64. Love v. Pullman, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.
VII). In Love, the district court poignantly noted:
Leftwich's application seeks an award for nearly 4,500 hours spent on
the case. In view of the fact that McClearn, who worked on this case for
more than twice as many years as Leftwich, who represented the class,
and who was involved in handling the more difficult and novel aspects
of the litigation before the Supreme Court, claims only 1,800 hours, I
must approach the Leftwich application with some degree of incredulity.
19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9167, at 7052. The attorney claiming 4,500 hours received fees at an hourly rate equivalent to 23% of that received by lead
counsel. Id. at 7053. See also Barnett v. Pritzker, 73 F.R.D. 430 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (settlement of derivative and class actions; recovery under equitable
fund doctrine). In Barnett, law firm "A" claimed 40 hours for time spent on
fee application, having spent 276.5 hours litigating the case in chief. Law
firm "B" claimed only 36.5 hours on its own application, having spent 2169.5
hours litigating the case in chief. The court allowed 15 of the 40 hours
claimed by firm "A." Id. at 433.
65. Boe v. Colello, 447 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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when a party is represented by more than one attorney, "the
possibility of duplication of effort along with the proper utilization of time should be scrutinized." 66 The basis for this rule was
succinctly stated by the Second Circuit: "Undoubtedly, parties
to a litigation may fashion it according to their purse and indulge themselves and their attorneys, but they may not foist
'67
their extravagances upon their unsuccessful adversaries.
Thus, when several attorneys for a party engage in duplicative
tasks, such as en masse attendance of conferences with defense
counsel, 68 participation in oral arguments, 69 and attendance at
depositions, 70 or when the prosecution of the entire litigation reflects multiplicity of effort,71 courts have reduced the final fee
award. Most courts have refused to award fees to attorneys who
66. 488 F.2d at 717; accord, Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 621
(S.D. Ala. 1978).
67. Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (securities fraud class action (quoting Farmer v. Arabian Oil Co., 31 F.R.D. 191, 193
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd, 324 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379 U.S. 227 (1964));
see Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1976)
(Clayton Act). In Blair, the court reduced the base fee award by 10% to
account for duplication of effort caused by plaintiff's substitution of counsel.
Id. at 1350. But see Stastney v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314
(W.D.N.C. 1978). In Stastney, the court refused to reduce the fee award on
grounds of duplication of effort caused by the mid-trial hospitalization of
one of plaintiff's attorneys. The court noted that "[i] n a trial of this magnitude ... and of this duration it is neither unusual, unexpected nor unreasonable that different attorneys will appear for a party, and that some
duplication of effort is necessary." Id. at 319.
68. Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 621 (S.D. Ala. 1978) (§ 1988
award reduced where two or more co-counsel attended conferences with
one defense counsel).
69. Love v. Pullman, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9167, at 7050 (D. Colo. 1979)
(Title VII) (court disallowed time claim by associated attorney for "watching oral argument"); Jordan v. Fusari, 422 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (D. Conn. 1975)
(civil rights class action, recovery under "private attorney general" doctrine). In Jordan, the plaintiff was represented by seven attorneys. Three
made oral arguments before the court of appeals in an earlier stage of the
litigation, and the court found that two or more attorneys would regularly
appear when the presence of one attorney would have sufficed. Id.
70. See Bachman v. Pertschuk, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 9043, at 6509
(D.D.C. 1979) (Title VII) (disallowed hours for multiple attendance at depositions); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 744 (D.R.I. 1979) (permitted only one attorney to be compensated for attendance at depositions or
for a prison tour).
71. Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743 (W.D.
Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title VII).
The Younger court noted that "where plaintiffs were generally represented
by no less than four attorneys throughout .

.

. the defendant company,

which was adequately represented, never had more than two attorneys
present." 418 F. Supp. at 793. After considering the other Johnson factors,
the court awarded plaintiff $40,000. An award of $121,568 was initially
sought. Id. at 795. In Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec.
9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (Title VII), the court reduced the fee award by $1000
dollars, viewing the multiple attendance of plaintiff's counsel at trial and at
depositions as "unnecessary duplication of effort." Id. at 5048. Davis was
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merely "back stopped" 72 or provided "moral support" for cocounsel.

73

One district court, without authority, compensated attorneys who merely appeared in court while lead counsel argued
various motions. 74 The justification advanced by that court for
its award to the non-participating attorneys was that they provided "ideas and information" to lead counsel. 75 This holding
invites law firms to pack courtrooms with non-participating attorneys so as to enhance gross recoveries of attorneys' fees. It
also permits firms to provide courtroom experience for their junior attorneys at the expense of section 1988 defendants.7 6 This
opinion runs against the weight of authority previously discussed.77 Because the district court opinion did not cite authority for its award of fees to "back stopping" counsel, the case does
not, and should not, have significant precedential impact.
Counsel fee claims for certain activities have been routinely
disallowed. Requests are never granted for time spent prosecuting frivolous or meritless issues within the litigation.7 8 In addition, courts strive to avoid a "double payment" to the plaintiff's
counsel where it appears that he rendered similar legal services
favorably cited in the Senate Report on section 1988. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 5908, 5913.
72. Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (equitable
fund doctrine). The Blank court criticized the use of multiple attorneys in
simple matters which presented no unusual problems such as where attorneys simply acted as a "back stop" for lead counsel. Id. at 4; accord,
Thompson v. School Bd.of City of Newport News, 363 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va.
1973), affd, 498 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1974) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School
Aid Act) (disfavored multiplying efforts with two or more attorneys where
one attorney did essentially all the work, hours disallowed).
73. Clanton v. Allied Chem. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Va. 1976) (Title
VII). The Clanton court stated that "[wI hile attorneys should not be penalized for providing full and exhaustive services for their clients, the awarding of fees to attorneys for supplying moral support, or because of their own
enthusiasm, is not warranted." Id. at 43.
74. Areizaga v. Quern, No. 77 C 276 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 1979).
75. Id. Compensation was granted to attorneys who were merely present at a motion for a temporary restraining order and the appeal of that
order.
76. By this statement, it is not to be inferred that counsel in Areizaga
entertained these motives. However, the possibilities for abusing such
rules in order to reap windfall fees should not be ignored by the courts.
77. See cases cited in notes 68-74 supra.
78. Time spent on issues "which are clearly frivolous," or "manufactured" do not represent time which has been "reasonably expended on a
matter," and the time claimed for prosecution of such issues may be disregarded by the court. Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1978). See
also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311, 316 n.3 (N.D. Fla. 1978);
Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 792 (W.D. Va.
1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title VII) (disallowed hours spent in plaintiff's persistent efforts to introduce evidence
pertaining to individuals ruled to be outside scope of class).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:331

79
in separate lawsuits, for which he seeks multiple fee recovery.
A third category of activity which may not be charged to an unsuccessful defendant is time spent by plaintiff's counsel attending continuing legal education seminars on topics related to the
litigation.8 0 Evidently, section 1988 does not require a defendant
to pay for the legal education of his adversary's counsel.

Segregation of Reduced Rate Activities
Another duty of a trial court in this stage of the Johnson
analysis is to segregate the hours spent on certain tasks which
command reduced hourly rates. 81 These activities may be
grouped into four broad categories: informal communications,
travel time, out-of-court legal work, and non-legal work performed by attorneys.
-Informal Communications
Informal communications can be subdivided into two categories. The first involves communciation with the public. One
federal district court permitted section 1988 recovery for time
spent by counsel communicating with the public regarding
school desegregation class action litigation. 82 In that case, class
counsel was compensated for time spent in "communication
with the class in a meaningful way," such as attendance at com79. Lockheed Min. Sol. Coal. v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 406 F.
Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Title VII) (counsel limited to one fee for
preparing set of interrogatories used against defendant in three separate
lawsuits). See also McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38, 43 (W.D. Va.
1978) (identical jurisdictional challenge raised in separate lawsuits and
fully billed to each; one-half of hours spent on challenge disallowed compensation); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978) (Title
VII) (Prandini II). The Prandini court stated in dicta that if it could be
demonstrated that time charged in one case was charged for in a separate
case for the "exact same work," a district court would not abuse its discretion by prorating the hours between the two cases. Id. at 51; see prior opinion, 557 F.2d 1015, 1019 n.3 (3d Cir. 1977) (Prandini I).
80. Love v. Pullman Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9166, at 7052 (D. Colo.
1979) (Title VII) (disallowed all claimed hours for attending NAACP lecture); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 410 (D. Colo. 1977).
81. The Johnson court noted:
It is appropriate to distinguish between legal work, in the strict sense,
and investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics and
other work which can often be accomplished by non-lawyers but which
a lawyer may do because he has no other help available. Such nonlegal work may command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not enhanced
just because a lawyer does it.
488 F.2d at 717. The Sixth Circuit recently observed "that it is desirable,
whenever possible, to vary the hourly rate awarded depending upon the
type of service provided." Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638
(6th Cir. 1979) (§ 1988).
82. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977)
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83
munity meetings and in press relations.

The second subdivision involves communication between
counsel and other attorneys, parties, and witnesses involved
with the litigation. Courts have disallowed significant numbers
of hours claimed for conferences between junior and senior attorneys. 84 Excessive hours claimed for attorney/client conferences have been disallowed. 85 Courts routinely reject all
undocumented claims for time spent in conference or in telephone communication with parties, witnesses, or attorneys. 86 In
any event, a court will determine the total amount of logged conference time, because such time is normally compensated at reduced hourly rates.8 7
83. Id. at 408. Thus, 17 of 46 hours claimed in press relations were allowed, because they permitted communication between class counsel and
the hispanic community. In contrast, time spent in interviews with reporters from out-of-state newspapers were disallowed as unnecessary for the
prosecution of the suit. Id. Hours spent by class counsel at community
meetings concerning the nature of the lawsuit and proposed desegregation
plans were generally allowed. Id. at 409. (85 of 92 hours allowed).
However, the court disallowed all hours (27) claimed for attendance at
school board meetings. Those hours were disallowed because the information obtained at those meetings, though "helpful to counsel," was not "necessary to the proper progression of the lawsuit." Id. at 408.
84. One district court stated that it did not "believe that defendant
should have to pay the double hourly rates for conferences between the
senior and junior attorneys." Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1067
(D.D.C. 1976), affid sub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Title VII). Total hours claimed for such conferences were reduced 20%.
Id.
85. Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875 (D.D.C. 1979) (Title
VII) (30 hours spent in 15 conferences with client held excessive).
86. See Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 155 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2869 (Title VII) (full 100 hours claimed for undocumented "miscellaneous" conferences disallowed); Dowell v. Board of Educ.
of Ind. School Dist. No. 89, 71 F.R.D. 49, 60 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (20 U.S.C. § 1617
(1976), Em. School Aid Act) (undocumented claim for time spent in conference with witnesses and principals entirely disallowed); cf. Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc., 493 F.2d 76, 80 (7th Cir. 1974)
(interpleader action, fees sought under "equitable fund doctrine"; entire 38
hours claim for undocumented telephone communications disallowed).
87. See Cruz v. Beto, 453 F. Supp. 905, 910 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (court
awarded a rate of $90 per hour for pre-trial work and $35 per hour for time
spent in informal communications); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1976), affd, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title VII) (time
logged in telephone and conference communications awarded rate of $35
per hour, reduced from $100 per hour claimed); Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F.
Supp. 133 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (20 U.S.C.
§ 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act) (reduced rate from $35 to $20 per hour for
logged conference hours).
Of course, a court may also disallow hours claimed in documented telephone or conference communications by counsel, to the extent the court
deems such hours to be excessive. See Pete v. United Mine Workers of Am.
Welfare & Relief Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (equitable fund
doctrine) (held: given district court's familiarity with the litigation, it was
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-Travel Time
Attorneys sometimes request fees for time spent commuting to court, attending depositions outside the locality, or other
legal tasks requiring travel. A few courts disallow hours claimed
for travel time entirely.8 8 Other courts have awarded reduced
rates of recovery for such claims. 89 The calculation of a reasonable fee for travel time is accomplished through a "two-step"
analysis. First, a court determines whether any of the claimed
hours are compensable; then the court will determine the rate of
compensation to be awarded for such time.90 Whether any
travel time hours are compensable depends on whether the expenditure of time was reasonably necessary for the prosecution
of the lawsuit.9 1
-Out of Court Legal Work
Time spent out of court by attorneys on legal matters may
be segregated and compensated for at lower rates than "in
court" time. At least one federal court has assigned a lower rate
of compensation for such tasks 92as research, drafting of documents, and preparation for trial.
not an abuse of discretion to disallow logged telephone and conference
time).
88. See NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (D.D.C. 1978) (all travel
time hours disallowed); Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F. Supp. 133, 142 n.10
(N.D. Miss. 1976), affid, 581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976),
Em. School Aid Act) (all travel time hours disallowed).
89. See McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ill.
1978) (travel time of $40 per hour awarded attorneys requesting $100 per
hour; and $25 per hour to attorneys requesting $75 per hour); Dean v.
Gladney, 451 F. Supp. 1313, 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (court awarded counsel $40
per hour for trial work, $25 per hour for pre-trial work, and $5 per hour for
travel time); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977)
(court reduced compensable hours from 140 to 96, assigned one-half normal
rate of compensation for remaining hours).
90. McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 758 (S.D. Ill.
1978).
91. Id; accord, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 409 (D. Colo.
1977). In McPherson, the court found that the hiring of out-of-state NAACP
counsel was resonable, even though the commuting time involved was 8
hours per appearance-notwithstanding affidavits to the effect that local
counsel would have been ready and able to represent the plaintiff in the
litigation. 465 F. Supp. at 758. In Keyes, the court allowed compensation for
some travel time because the litigation was complex, and the class counsel
needed to collaborate with out-of-state experts. 439 F. Supp. at 409.
92. See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 741 (D.R.I. 1979) (court
awarded $75 per hour for trial work and $70 per hour for pre-trial work);
McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38, 43 (W.D. Va. 1978) (opinion recognizes that out-of-court hours should be compensated at reduced rates-but
it does not disclose the actual fee rates awarded); Dean v. Gladney, 451 F.
Supp. 1313, 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (court awarded $40 per hour for trial work
and $25 per hour for pre-trial work).
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-Non Legal Tasks Performed by Attorneys
Under Johnson, an attorney should not be compensated at
his normal hourly billing rates for the performance of non-legal
tasks. 93 Federal court rulings on section 1988 fee requests have
refused to compensate attorneys for the performance of paralegal tasks, 94 or award fees to paralegals. 95 One federal court has
compensated attorneys at reduced rates for the performance of
96
tasks which could have been performed by paralegals.
Hours Spent Seeking an Award of Attorneys' Fees

Federal courts are currently in conflict on the issue of
whether hours spent seeking an award of attorneys' fees under
section 1988 are compensable. The issue of whether an attorney
could be compensated for time spent seeking fees first arose in
cases involving the "equitable fund doctrine." 97 This doctrine is
similar in operation to an action in quantum meruit. Fees are
awarded to parties who, through their private litigation, created,
increased, protected, or preserved a "fund" which inured to the
benefit of a class of beneficiaries.9 8 The award of counsel fees
93. The table in note 234 infra lists cases following this practice.
94. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977) (disallowed all 25 hours claimed by attorneys for filing pleadings and picking up
orders).
95. Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978). The Scheriff court
stated:
The last item is $198 requested for reimbursement for expenses incurred in connection with the work of law clerks. The court has consistently distinguished between the work of attorneys and law clerks. The
fee award statute refers only to attorney fees. It does not include any
mention of fees for law clerks or expenses connected with secretaries
or other office overhead. Under the civil rights fees statutes the court
cannot award any sums for the work of law clerks or paralegal assistants.
Id. at 1261; cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9167, at page 7050
(D. Colo. 1979) (Title VII) (court refused to compensate an attorney for
clerical expenses). Contra, Aumiller v. University of Del., 455 F. Supp. 676,
682 (D. Del. 1978) (§ 1988) (court awarded $25 per hour fee to law school
graduate, and $20 per hour fee to paralegal); Jordan v. Fusari, 422 F. Supp.
1179, 1186 (D. Conn. 1975) (private attorney general doctrine) (court allowed $3 per hour fee for services of paralegal; plaintiff had requested $10
per hour).
96. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 742-43 (D.R.I. 1979) (court
awarded less than half the in-court fee rate for hours spent scanning prison
and municipal records for evidence).
97. The origin and history of the "equitable fund doctrine," or "common
fund doctrine," is set forth at note 6 supra. See generally Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients In Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849
(1975).
98. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257
(1975); Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 540 F.2d
102 (3d Cir. 1976).
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under this doctrine is drawn from the "fund" created by the litigation. Thus, when an attorney seeks fees under the equitable
fund doctrine, he is acting on his own behalf, adversely to the
interests of the benefited class.9 9 Because the objective of a feeseeking attorney is to diminish the "fund," an overwhelming
majority of federal courts refuse to compensate attorneys under
the equitable fund doctrine for their efforts to obtain an award of
attorneys' fees. 100
In the context of section 1988 litigation, some courts compensate an attorney for the time he expends seeking a section
10 2
1988 fee. 10 1 Some courts disallow such time claims entirely.
Courts declining to compensate attorneys for time spent seeking
section 1988 awards have done so on authority of the "equitable
fund doctrine" precedents. 103 These courts express the belief
that section 1988 fee awards, like those under the equitable fund
doctrine, should compensate an attorney only for time expended in prosecuting his client's civil rights claim. Accordingly, these courts refuse to compensate attorneys for time
spent litigating their own entitlement to fees, because the legal
10 4
services rendered do not inure to the benefit of the client.
Courts which do award attorneys' fees under section 1988
for services rendered in connection with a fee application have
99. See Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 540
F.2d 102, 111 (3d Cir. 1976).
100. Id.; Pete v. United Mine Workers of Am. Welfare & Relief Fund of
1950, 517 F.2d 1275, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc., 493 F.2d 76, 80 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Equity Funding
Corp. of Am. Sec., 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1330 n.36 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Dorfman v.
First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F.
Supp. 1311, 1318 (D.D.C. 1973). Contra, Barnett v. Pritzker, 73 F.R.D. 430, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (derivative class action; court allowed 15 of 40 hours claimed
on fee application, without citation of authority).
101. See cases cited in notes 105-08 infra.
102. See cases cited in note 103 infra.
103. See Diaz v. Quern, No. 76 C 3349 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 1979) (summary
disallowance of time spent seeking a fee award); Keown v. Storti, 456 F.
Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (after careful analysis of cases permitting and disallowing such hours, court denied recovery of fees for time spent seeking
fees, holding that only those legal services directly benefiting client are
compensable under § 1988); Boe v. Colello, 447 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (follows equitable fund doctrine cases); Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F.
Supp. 1274, 1281 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (summary disallowance of hours claimed
for seeking fees); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700, 705 (E.D. Pa.
1977), affid mem., 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978) (follows equitable fund doctrine cases); cf. Pace v. Califano, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7547, at 4712 (D.D.C.
1977) (Title VII); Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1350
(S.D. Tex. 1976) (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1975), Clayton Act); Davis v. Reed, 72 F.R.D.
644, 647 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (20 U.S.C. § 1617, (1976), Em. School Aid Act);
Clanton v. Allied Chem. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. Va. 1976) (Title VII);
Latham v. Chandler, 406 F. Supp. 754, 757 n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 l(e) (1978), Voting Rights Act).
104. See Keown v. Storti, 456 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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done so on three grounds. First, they distinguish the equitable
fund doctrine cases as inapplicable to section 1988 litigation, because those fees are collected from the defendant, not from the
attorney's client or a class of beneficiaries. 10 5 Second, these
courts hold that the denial of compensation for an attorney's efforts to obtain a fee would defeat the policy goal of section 1988,
which is to encourage private attorneys to represent civil rights
litigants. These courts assert that the denial of such fees would
give defendants an incentive to regularly appeal the issue of fee
the net award of fees granted to
entitlement, thus dissipating
10 6
plaintiff's counsel.
The third justification for such an award is drawn from the
legislative history of section 1988. The House Report discussion
of the standards governing the award of fees favorably cited one
Title VII case permitting an award for time spent seeking compensation.1 0 7 At least two federal circuits have drawn upon this
08
legislative history to justify such an award.'
The law on this issue is unsettled, and the number of case
holdings on each side of the issue is roughly equivalent. 10 9 The
fact that the majority of circuit courts of appeals have permitted
compensation for time expended seeking section 1988 fees may
place the weight of authority with the courts permitting com105. See Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 343 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 44 (1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 170 (1979); Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 614 (1st Cir.
1977); Rote v. Hall, No. C-76-228 (E.D. Wash., filed May 14, 1979); Mental Patient Civil Lib. Project v. Hospital Staff Civil Rights Comm., 444 F. Supp. 981,
986 (E.D. Pa. 1977); cf. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 54 (3d Cir.
1978) (Title VII); Bachman v. Pertschuk, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9044, at 6504
(D.D.C. 1979) (Title VII); Richardson v. Civil Serv. Comm., 449 F. Supp. 10,
12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Title VII).
106. One court decided to permit compensation for time spent seeking
section 1988 fees, stating that "[tlo hold otherwise would permit a deep
pocket losing party to dissipate the incentive provided by an award through
recalcitrance and automatic appeals." Lackey v. Bowling, No. 78 C 1980
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1979) (quoting Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609,-614 (2d
Cir. 1977)). See also Richardson v. Civil Serv. Comm., 449 F. Supp. 10, 12
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Title VII).
107. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 683-84 (N.D. Cal. 1974), afd
on other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436
U.S. 547 (1978),favorably cited in H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
n.16 (1976).
108. Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.
Ct. 44 (1979); Aumiller v. University of Del., 455 F. Supp. 676, 681 (D. Del.
1978).
109. See section 1988 cases cited in note 103 supra (six district court
opinions deny § 1988 recovery on time spent litigating issue of fee entitlement), and section 1988 cases cited in notes 105-06 supra (three court of
appeals decisions and three district court opinions permitting § 1988 recovery for time expended litigating entitlement to award).
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pensation." 0 Nonetheless, policy justifications support both
lines of cases.
The reasoning of the courts permitting compensation for efforts to obtain section 1988 fees is subject to question. The asserted fear that the denial of compensation for time spent
seeking fees would result in "automatic appeals" by defendants
is to an extent unfounded."' Courts have traditionally possessed equitable power to punish parties who litigate claims "in
1' 1 2
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.
If defendants "automatically" appeal an award of attorneys' fees
in order to diminish the successful attorney's net recovery, or if
a successful plaintiff's attorney "automatically" appeals the issue of fees to increase his recovery, courts can employ their equitable powers to punish these litigants and deter others from
3
taking a similar course of action."
The support drawn from public policy considerations is similarly suspect. It is not unusual for an attorney to expend nearly
as much time establishing his right to fees as on the prosecution
of the underlying action." 4 It is one thing to compensate an attorney in full for his vigorous efforts to prosecute the civil rights
claim of his client. It is another thing entirely for a court to compensate that attorney, at full market rates, for a vigorous effort
to establish his own claim. In the latter case, the attorney is no
longer litigating civil rights, but is pursuing his own pecuniary
5
interests, like any other creditor of the defendant."
Technically the attorney litigates the issue of fees on behalf
of his client. Substantively, however, efforts to obtain section
1988 fees inure only to the attorney's pecuniary benefit. The rule
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Alyeska" 6
110. See note 109 supra.

111. The courts have merely asserted this rationale, without providing
evidentiary support for its validity. See cases cited in note 106 supra.
112. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 25859 (1975). See generally Dawson, Lawyers And Involuntary Clients In Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975) (complete discussion of

the development and use of the equitable "bad faith" awards doctrine).
113. The "bad faith" doctrine can be applied to any party who has
demonstrated reprehensible conduct in connection with the litigation.

Thus, this doctrine would serve to deter either plaintiffs or defendants from
taking frivolous appeals to financially injure opponents.

114. See, e.g., McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Va. 1978) (attorney expended 26 hours on case-in-chief, and up to 14 additional hours on

question of fee award entitlement).
115. The courts ordinarily order unsuccessful defendants to pay the attorneys' fee award directly to counsel for the plaintiff. See note 167 infra.
Thus, although a fee award proceeding may be ancillary to the civil rights

claim of the plaintiff, the award of attorneys' fees itself does not necessarily
inure to the benefit of the plaintiff.
116. See cases cited in note 13 supra.
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precludes the nonstatutory shifting of attorneys' fee liability
among parties. This rule has been superseded by statutes such
as section 1988 which permit a prevailing civil rights litigant to
be reimbursed for the cost of prosecuting his civil rights claim.
Whether section 1988 permits an attorney to be compensated for
his efforts to establish his own claim to fees is a policy question
which remains to be authoritatively settled by the federal
courts. In any event, time unnecessarily expended in seeking
an award of attorneys' fees may be disallowed or compensated
11 7
at reduced hourly rates.
Constructions of the Remaining Johnson Factors
Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions
The Johnson court included the "novelty and difficulty" factor in its analysis, in recognition of the greater expenditure of
time required to research and prosecute a case of first impression. 118 Its underlying rationale is that attorneys "should be appropriately compensated for accepting the challenge" of a novel
case. 119 Accordingly, the courts have indicated that attorneys
should be compensated at increased rates where the underlying
litigation creates "new law"'120 or involves complex questions of
12 1
law or fact.
The "novelty" of a case is determined subjectively by the
trial court 122 from the standpoint of the lawsuit when it was ini117. See McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 759 (S.D. Ill.
1978) (excessive time spent seeking fees disallowed); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 410 (D. Colo. 1977) (excessive hours expended on fee
issue disallowed; remaining hours awarded reduced rates of compensation
because fee entitlement issue was neither difficult nor complex).
118. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.
1974).
119. Id.
120. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (novel due
process challenge to pre-trial detention procedures); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 403 (D. Colo. 1977) (first case to establish de jure
school segregation in a northern city). Keyes was a case which was novel
from both a legal and a factual standpoint. See also Swann v. CharlotteMecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (20 U.S.C.
§ 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act) (first school busing case).
121. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 403 (D. Colo.
1977); Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Miss. 1978). The Armstrong
court recognized that the case involved "complicated and complex" questions of law "not ordinarily or usually handled by an attorney in the general
practice of law." 462 F. Supp. at 502.
122. Rubenstein v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 351 (N.D.
Tex. 1976) (class securities litigation; elements of novelty and difficulty of
case can be evaluated by court which has closely supervised and observed
progress of case).
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tiated. 123 This reflects the greater degree of preparation required to prosecute a case of first impression. In addition, a
court's assessment of novelty and difficulty should be made regarding the issues involved in the litigation, regardless of the
124
personal experience and skill of counsel.
This factor will not apply to a case which is not novel or does
not present "unusually difficult legal questions.' 25 The mere
fact that a case takes a long time to prosecute is not a proper
reason for increasing the hourly rate under this factor. 126 Nor
does the presence of "tedious, but uncomplicated tasks" within
1 27
the litigation make it "novel" or "difficult."'
Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly
Under the "skill" factor, a trial court "should closely observe
the attorney's work product, his preparation, and general ability
before the court."1 28 The rendition of exceptionally skillful legal services should cause a court to increase the attorney's basic
recovery rate. 129 Where an attorney does not display any "special skill,"'130 or where the litigation did not call for the demon123. Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 793
(W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title
VII).
124. Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 938 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 2820 (1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1973 l(e) (1978), Voting Rights Act).
125. See Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875 (D.D.C. 1979)
(Title VII) (case was not one of first impression and did not present unusually difficult legal questions); Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 621
(S.D. Ala. 1978) (factor held inapplicable to case which was not one of first
impression); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 411
(D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1934 (1975)
(20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act) (questions involved were not
novel).
126. Barnett v. Kalinowski, 458 F. Supp. 689, 703 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
127. Rubenstein v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 351 (N.D.
Tex. 1976) (class securities litigation).
128. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.
1974).
129. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D. Fla. 1979) ("capable
and talented lawyer" handled case "in finest lawyer-like manner;" final
award after consideration of other factors set at $90 per hour); Armstrong v.
Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496, 502 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (case handled "expertly with
dispatch"-$40 per hour rate awarded); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F.
Supp. 393, 404 (D. Colo. 1977) ("excellent work product;" all attorneys "performed in a thorough dedicated and professional way").
130. See Love v. Pullman Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 9167, at 7051 (D. Colo.
1979) (Title VII) (initial initiative demonstrated by counsel was offset by
counsel's sluggish performance in bringing lawsuit to a close; litigation was
counsel's first civil rights case; and counsel did not bring any particular expertise into the case; skill factor apparently operated in neutral fashion);
Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646, 649 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (equitable fund
doctrine) (where counsel performed "with that degree of competence
which the Court expects of all counsel practicing" at bar, held that "no spe-
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stration of "special skills,"' 3'1 this factor should operate in a
neutral fashion; it should neither increase nor decrease the rate
of recovery. A poor performance by counsel, however, may result in a decrease in the overall rate of recovery assigned by the
13 2

court.

Preclusion of Other Employment
This factor permits a court to increase the recovery rate of
an attorney whose participation in the instant lawsuit precluded
him from engaging in otherwise available business. Such preclusion can arise as a result of a conflict of interest or from sheer
time demands imposed by litigation which disrupts an attor133
ney's normal practice.
Courts have taken varying approaches to the preclusion factor. One district court considered this factor as increasing the
fee to be awarded notwithstanding the fact that no evidence had
been adduced that prevailing counsel had been precluded from
engaging in contemporaneous litigation. 34 Other courts do not
apply the factor absent a showing by counsel of preclusion of
other business. 35 Most courts will increase a fee award where it
is demonstrated that considerable time and effort was expended
on the litigation. 136 Nonetheless, where it is shown that prevailcial skill was demonstrated which would warrant increasing an otherwise
reasonable fee").
131. See Sonnenburg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875, at 5617 (D.D.C.
1979) (Title VII); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394,
411 (D. Md. 1974), afj-d, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034
(1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act).
132. In Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743 (W.D.
Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title VII),
the tendency of counsel to complete tasks at the "last minute," which
delayed the prosecution of the litigation, was held to justify a decrease in
the recovery rate of that attorney. 418 F. Supp. at 794.
133. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.
1974).
134. Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 794
(W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title
VII) (court explained that it increased award under this factor "so as not to
penalize the attorneys involved" for accepting lengthy, time consuming
case).
135. See Love v. Pullman Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9167, at 7051 (D. Colo.
1979) (court declined to apply factor in absence of affidavit or testimony
demonstrating preclusion--even though claiming attorney expended 1300
hours throughout litigation); Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
8875, at 5618 (D.D.C. 1979) (Title VII) (factor not considered in absence of
claim by attorney); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394,
411 (D. Md. 1974), affid, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034
(1975) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act) (court did not consider
factor in absence of showing of preclusion).
136. See Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314, 319
(W.D.N.C. 1978) (Title VII) (court indicated that four attorneys expending
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ing counsel engaged in other contemporaneous litigation, many
courts decline to increase a fee award under the preclusion factor.

13 7

In considering this factor, the courts generally weigh the
disruptive financial and procedural effects which lengthy, contingent civil rights litigation may have on an attorney's private
practice. 138 A specialized civil rights firm does not suffer the
kind of "disruption" encountered by general practice firms
which are neither structured to engage in lengthy, complex civil
rights litigation nor accustomed to the contingent fee basis on
which section 1988 cases are often litigated. 1 39 Courts have accordingly held that attorneys who specialize in civil rights litigation are not entitled under the preclusion factor to higher than
normal rates for their services.1 40 It should be noted that the
rate of recovery awarded civil rights specialists should generally
be greater than awards to general practice attorneys, to reflect
other factors such as the greater skill,' 4' experience, 142 and re2500 hours in litigation lasting one year would be entitled to increased fee
under preclusion factor); Sherrill v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 441 F. Supp. 846, 848
(W.D.N.C. 1977) (court indicated that attorney expending 1300 hours on litigation over a period of 4.5 years would be entitled to increased fees under
preclusion factor); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 858 (M.D. Fla. 1975),
modified on othergrounds, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) (common benefit doctrine) (court indicated that attorney who devoted "a large portion of his
practice ...

exclusively to this particular lawsuit" would be entitled to in-

creased fee under preclusion factor).
137. Vant Hul v. City of Dell Rapids, 465 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (D.S.D. 1979)
(Title VII) (preclusion factor not applied where plaintiffs attorneys accepted other employment during instant litigation); Rubenstein v. Republic
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 351 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (class securities litigation); Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F. Supp. 133, 142 (N.D. Miss. 1976), affd, 581
F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act). See
also Bachman v. Pertschuk, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9044, at 6508 (D.D.C. 1979)
(Title VII) (unemployed attorney who expended 19 hours per week in instant litigation held not entitled to increased fees under preclusion factor).
138. McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 762 (S.D. Ill.
1978); Aumiller v. University of Del., 455 F. Supp. 676, 683 (D. Del. 1978)
(§ 1988) (increased fee, after noting that prosecution of lawsuit on contingent fee basis created "cash flow problems" for counsel's small firm). See
also Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (law professor
who maintained limited civil rights practice held not entitled to higher
hourly rate under preclusion factor).
139. McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 762 (S.D. Ill.
1978).
140. Neely v. City of Grenada, 77 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (Title VII).
When addressing the preclusion factor, the Neely court noted:
This factor does not weigh heavily in the eyes of the court since
plaintiff's counsel emphasize, if they do not indeed specialize in, civil
rights litigation. Their success in this action, and the enhancement of
their reputation as a natural result thereof, will benefit, rather than
hamper, the practice of these attorneys.
77 F.R.D. at 486.
141. See notes 128-32 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of
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sults obtained 143 by experienced civil rights attorneys. Thus, an
increased award to a seasoned civil rights specialist under the
"preclusion" factor is not needed to award a reasonable fee.
In Lund v. Affleck, 14 a district court indicated that staff
counsel employed by a federally funded legal services organization are entitled to an increased fee award under the preclusion
factor. The Lund court recognized that the legal services organization attorneys were not "precluded" from engaging in "more
lucrative" work. 145 Nonetheless, the court justified its award on
the ground that it would aid the legal services organization (to
which the fee would inure) to expand its capacity to provide legal services to the poor. 146 This holding is rather anomalous in
light of the fact that these federally funded organizations are
precluded by federal regulations from actively engaging in fee147
generating cases.
The Lund approach to the preclusion factor cannot be justified under Johnson, because the prosecution of a civil rights
case cannot be said to preclude the organization from engaging
the effects of an attorney's skillful performance on the size of an attorneys'
fee award.
142. See notes 208-12 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the
influence of the experience of an attorney as a factor increasing or decreas-

ing the size of an attorneys' fee award.
143. See notes 202-07 infra for a discussion of the extent to which

favorable results obtained by an attorney for his client influence the size of
an award of attorneys' fees granted such counsel under section 1988.
144. 442 F. Supp. 1109 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978).

145. Id.at 1116.
146. Id.
147. Recipient organizations under the Legal Services Corporation Act,
such as the organization in Lund, are extremely restricted in their capacity
to litigate actions which are likely to generate fees for that organization.
The relevant regulations are codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1609 (1978). These regu-

lations provide:
§ 1609.1 Purpose

This part is designed to insure that recipients do not compete with
private attorneys and, at the same time, to guarantee that eligible clients are able to obtain appropriate and effective legal assistance.
§ 1609.2 Definition
"Fee-generating case" means any case or matter which, if under-

taken on behalf of an eligible client by an attorney in private practice,
reasonably may be expected to result in a fee for legal services from an
award to a client, from public funds, or from the opposing party.

§ 1609.3 Prohibition
No recipient shall use funds received from the Corporation to provide legal assistance in a fee-generating case unless other adequate
representation is unavailable. All recipients shall establish procedures
for the referral of fee-generating cases.
§ 1609.4 Authorized representation in a fee-generating case
Other adequate representation is deemed to be unavailable when
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in "otherwise available business." 148 Similarly, not-for-profit legal services organizations, not dependent on attorneys' fees for
their continued operation, can hardly be said to be financially
"disrupted" by engaging in section 1988 litigation. 49 It would be
ludicrous to suggest that private law firms should be granted
windfall fees under the preclusion factor, in the hope that they
would hire additional associates, paralegals, and clerks for handling civil rights claims. Yet, the increased fee award in Lund
reflects just such a rationale.
The fallacy of the court's reasoning is its apparent assumption that section 1988 was meant to provide a funding mechanism through which federal courts support local legal services
organizations. The legislative history of section 1988 does not
(a) The recipient has determined that free referral is not possible because:
(1) The case has been rejected by the local lawyer referral service, or by two private attorneys; or
(2) Neither the referral service nor any lawyer will consider the
case without payment of a consultation fee; or
(3) The case is of the type that private attorneys in the area ordinarily do not accept, or do not accept without prepayment of a fee; or
(4) Emergency circumstances compel immediate action before
referral can be made, but the client is advised that, if appropriate, and
consistent with professional responsibility, referral will be attempted at
a later time; or
(b) Recovery of damages is not the principal object of the case
and a request for damages is merely ancillary to an action for equitable
or other non-pecuniary relief; or inclusion of a counterclaim requesting
damages is necessary for effective defense or because of applicable
rules governing joinder of counterclaims; or
(c) A court appoints a recipient or an employee of a recipient pursuant to a statute or a court rule or practice of equal applicability to all
attorneys in the jurisdiction.
(d) An eligible client is seeking benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401, et seq., Federal Old Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance Benefits; or Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. 1381, et seq., Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and
Disabled.
148. This statement presumes that the Johnson court referred to "otherwise available business" in connection with the preclusion factor, in the logical sense of the term: as remunerative business. 488 F.2d at 718.
149. It should be noted that the regulations cited in note 147 supra
merely prohibit federally funded legal services organizations from expending federalfunds to solicit and engage in "fee-generating cases." See 45
C.F.R. § 1609.3 (1978). Thus, if a legal services organization decided to open
a branch clinic with non-federal funds, on a fee paying basis, the operations
of that branch could conceivably be entitled to an increased fee award
under the "preclusion factor." Accordingly, if a legal services organization
can demonstrate that it was precluded from other fee-generating business
as a result of the litigation, they may, like any other private practitioner, be
entitled to increased recovery under this factor. See Palmer v. Rogers, 10
Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,449 at 6131 (D.D.C. 1975) (Title VII) (small public interest law firm which operated on fee-paying basis held entitled to increased fee award under preclusion factor).
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evidence such an intent. Indeed, it is the duty of Congress,
under the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1964,150 to fund
these organizations. 15 1 The judiciary should refrain from construing the Johnson factors merely to provide legal services organizations more than reasonable section 1988 fees. At least one
federal court has expressly recognized that section 1988 "was
not intended to subsidize public interest organizations.' 5 2
Other courts addressing the issue have declined opportunities
to apply the preclusion factor to increase an award of fees to
153
counsel employed by legal services organizations.
Overall, an attorney seeking an increased award under the
"preclusion factor," should submit a request for such compensation. Additionally, he should be prepared to support his request
with evidence documenting the disruptive effects prosecution of
the civil rights claim had on his practice.
The Customary Fee
The "customary fee" factor directs a court's attention to fees
charged in the community for similar work, as a measure of an
appropriate hourly rate to be awarded attorneys for engaging in
specific types of litigation.154 In no case should the base rate
awarded be lower than the $20 per hour out-of-court rate prescribed by the Criminal Justice Act.' 55 A court may determine
the prevailing community rates for civil rights litigation on the
basis of affidavits of disinterested parties 56 or its own judicial
157
knowledge of such rates.
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996 et seq. (Supp. 1979).
151. Appropriations under that Act have climbed to 300 million dollars
for fiscal 1980. See note 313 infra.
152. Page v. Preisser, 468 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
153. Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496, 502 n.5 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (plaintiff was represented by staff attorney for civil rights organization who was
not dependent upon his private practice for his livelihood, and was not precluded from acceptance of other employment); Cole v. Tuttle, 462 F. Supp.
1016, 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (court cryptically noted that preclusion factor
had no application to the case sub judice; counsel for plaintiffs were staff
attorneys employed by legal services organization).
154. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.
1974).
155. Id.; Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 691 (S.D. Tex.
1976), arfd, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title VII).
156. Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (court utilized
affidavits of experienced local civil rights attorneys); Sonnenberg v. Adams,
18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875, at 5618 (D.D.C. 1979) (Title VII) (affidavit of disinterested attorney utilized).
157. Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (court took
judicial notice of prevailing rates); Central Soya Co. v. Cox Towing Corp.,
431 F. Supp. 502, 505 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (because courts regularly come into
contact with reasonable fee questions, they are considered experts on is-
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Courts have construed this Johnson factor to require an attorney to submit his own customary billing schedule as a guide.
They use this information as a starting point in fee calculations,
reasoning that the "value of an attorney's time generally is reflected in his normal billing rates."1 58 Other courts place primary emphasis on local billing rates as determinative of a
reasonable fee rate. 159 Out-of-state counsel will generally be
awarded a fee reflecting local community rates, regardless of
their normal billing schedule; unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that he was unable "through diligent, good faith efforts to
retain local counsel."' 60 Overall, the courts are often wary of an
attorney's asserted "customary" fee rate. Although the "customary" billing rates of an attorney are thought to reflect the
quality of his work, the quality of the legal services rendered in
the instant litigation should primarily govern the "reasonable"
fee to be taxed to unsuccessful litigants under section 1988.161
Whether the Fee Is Fixed or Contingent
The "contingency" factor, as stated by the Johnson court,
was meant to focus judicial scrutiny on any contract for attorneys' fees which may have been executed between the plaintiff
and his attorney. 162 The contract, whether based on a fixed
hourly rate or a percentage of recovery, provides a court with an
indication of what that attorney considered a "reasonable fee"
when he entered into litigation. 163 Accordingly, some courts desue); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 19, 22 (N.D. Miss. 1976)
(Title VII) (court took judicial notice of rates it had awarded in prior cases).
158. City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 473 (2d Cir. 1974)
(equitable fund doctrine); Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 621 (S.D.
Ala. 1978).
159. Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 809, 813 (D. Minn. 1977) (counsel
requested rate of $75 per hour but was awarded $60 per hour which was
normal fee requested in community for that type of litigation, if fee was
charged at all).
160. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311, 315 (N.D. Fla. 1978).
161. One court aptly noted:
Just as time alone cannot dictate the amount of the award, neither can
the attorneys' customary fee control. The customary fee is but one factor in the ultimate equation determining a reasonable attorney fee. In
the final analysis, what is reasonable depends on the quality of the
work performed, not on the quantity of work performed multiplied by a

very generous customary fee.

Love v. Pullman Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.

9167, at 7049 (D. Colo. 1979) (Title

VII).
162. The Johnson court noted that "[tIhe fee quoted to the client or the
percentage of the recovery agreed to is helpful in demonstrating the attor-

ney's fee expectations when he accepted the case." 488 F.2d at 718.
163. Id. Indeed, the court noted that when such a contract was existent,
the litigant should not "be awarded a fee greater than he is contractually
bound to pay, if indeed the attorneys have contracted as to amount." Id.
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cline to consider the contingency factor when no contract for
1 64
fees has been executed.
Other courts, however, have expanded this factor by considering the contingent nature of recovery under section 1988165 as
justifying increased hourly rate awards absent contractual fee
arrangements between the parties. 166 It is questionable
whether an "agreement" between attorney and client limiting
fee recovery to an amount obtained pursuant to section 1988 can
be construed to be a contract. When an attorney accepts a case
on this fee basis, courts have traditionally ordered defendants to
pay any award of attorneys' fees directly to counsel. 167 Thus, it
is difficult to find legal consideration which would raise such
"agreements" to the level of a contract.
But disregarding this contract law question, these "contingency" awards find support in both the Johnson opinion and the
underlying policy goals of section 1988. First, an attorney who
164. Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Dean v.
Gladney, 451 F. Supp. 1313, 1323 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
165. A party must "prevail," or win on the merits, before he is entitled to
an award of attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1978). See note 24 supra.
166. See Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 621 (S.D. Ala. 1978)
(compensation was entirely contingent on award of fees under the Act); cf.
Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (E.D. La. 1974) (Title VII)
(compensation contingent on prevailing under the Act); Morton v. Charles
County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 411 (D. Md. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 871
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em.
School Aid Act) (substantial fee contingent on prevailing on merits).
167. When an attorney has litigated a case on a pro bono publico basis,
the courts have always ordered the unsuccessful defendant to pay any
award of attorneys' fees directly to counsel. See Rote v. Hall, No. C-76-228
(E.D. Wash., filed May 14, 1979). The Rote court stated that "[iIn accordance with prevailing practice, these fees are awarded to the legal services
organization directly rather than to the named plaintiffs themselves. This
procedure prevents any windfall to plaintiffs who were not charged for attorney services." (Note: this opinion can be obtained from the National
Clearinghouse For Legal Services; case No. 26,850); Stephenson v. Simon,
448 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D.D.C. 1978) (Title VII) (order entered requiring defendant to pay fee award to counsel for plaintiff); Alsager v. District Ct. of
Polk County, 447 F. Supp. 572, 580 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (entered order that
plaintiff's counsel was entitled to fee); cf. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231,
1245 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b), § 216(b) (1975), ADEA) (awarded fee to counsel to avoid windfall
to plaintiff); Hairston v. R. & R. Apts., 510 F.2d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1975) (42
U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1973), Fair Housing Act) (awarded fee to organization to
avoid windfall to client); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th
Cir. 1974) (private attorney general doctrine) (awarded fee to organization
to avoid windfall to plaintiff).
Thus, except in those cases where a prevailing party has paid his attorney to prosecute the action, the "prevailing party" never comes into possession of the fee award. In light of this case law, it is difficult to determine just
what legal consideration is promised an attorney by a client under an
agreement which specifies that compensation for legal services will be pursuant to section 1988, if at all.
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undertakes representation on a contingent fee basis generally
commands a recovery rate greater than would be likely under a
non-contingent hourly rate basis.' 68 If prevailing rates are
higher for legal services rendered on a contingent basis, it would
seem that the Johnson "customary fee" factor already takes this
into account. 169 Hence, it appears that the courts have dealt
with the effects of "contingency" under the wrong Johnson factor. This "error" will remain one of form, not substance, as long
as the "contingency" is examined somewhere in a court's attorneys' fee award determinations.
Support for the utilization of a mere "contingency" factor in
fee award determinations can also be drawn by reference to the
broad policy goals underlying section 1988.170 Section 1988 was
designed to encourage private enforcement of civil rights
laws.' 7 ' It has been and should be construed liberally to achieve
its remedial purpose. 72 If rates in the legal community are reasonably increased to reflect contingency, the courts should consider this factor in their efforts to award a reasonablefee to the
claiming attorney. The higher rate granted an attorney who litigates on a contingent basis permits that attorney to absorb inevitable losses incurred in other, unsuccessfully pursued
168. One court aptly stated: "[NIo one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to charge, when successful, as little as
he would charge a client who in advance had agreed to pay for his services,
regardless of success." Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646, 648 (M.D. Ala.
1976); accord, Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
8875 (D.D.C.
1979) (Title VII); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 375 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 540 F.2d
102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976); cf. Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule 2-106 (B)-(8) (1969).
169. If contingent fee increases are "customary" in the locality, it would
seem that the Johnson "customary fee" factor, discussed at notes 154-61
supra, would encompass such considerations.
170. Some support for this practice can be found in the legislative history
of section 1988. Two cases cited in the Senate Report, Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974); and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975), appear to sanction "mere
contingency" increases in judicial awards of attorneys' fees. S. REP. No.
1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5913. The House Report on section 1988, however, cites only to Johnson when discussing the appropriate factors to be considered by a court in
determining reasonable fee awards. Rather than engage in extended and
perhaps fruitless discussion of whether Johnson or the cases cited in the
Senate Report should control on this point, it is better to examine the broad
purpose of section 1988 itself for resolution of this issue.
171. The House Report on section 1988 clearly confirms this purpose.
That Report states: "In authorizing an award of reasonable attorneys' fees,
[section 1988] is designed to give such persons effective access to the judicial process where their grievances can be resolved according to law." H.R.
REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
172. See Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d
Cir. 1978); Seals v. Quarterly County Ct., 562 F.2d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 1977).
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contingent fee actions. 173 In addition, attorneys are encouraged
to litigate cases on a contingent fee basis, thereby removing
financial barriers to the prosecution of civil rights claims of indigents. 174 At least one court has observed that a "failure to make
contingency calculations in determining fee awards . ..would
discourage many attorneys from accepting pro bono publico
cases by presenting them with the financially unacceptable risk
of wasting hours of work, overhead and expenses over a course
of successful and unsuccessful civil actions.' 75 Such a result
would circumvent the policy rationale which prompted Congress to enact section 1988.
Accepting the proposition that contingency is a factor which
should be considered by a court in its ascertainment of a reasonable fee, the procedures affecting this factor become important.
The size of a contingent fee, whether negotiated between parties
or judicially imposed, is related to the strength of the case: the
stronger the case, the smaller the attorney's share. 176 A development arising within or without the litigation which increases
the likelihood of success on the merits will influence a court to
decrease the contingency award for services subsequently rendered. Thus, a settlement as to liability, in whole or in part, if it
is accomplished early in the ligitation will diminish any contingency award for time spent on remaining issues or in ancillary
173. See, e.g., Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
affid on other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
174. The availability of attorneys who work on a contingent fee basis is of
particular benefit to the indigent, who can not afford to advance a retainer
to an attorney.
175. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1974), ard on
other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S.
547 (1978).
176. See Love v. Pullman Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 9167, at 7049 (D. Colo.
1979) (Title VII). The Love court indicated that the contingency factor
would be applied to determine the fee recovery of attorneys who handled
an early stage of the litigation, prior to an appeal of a procedural issue to the
United States Supreme Court. Id. The court went on to note, however, that
the contingency factor would not apply so heavily to the fee applications of
attorneys who entered the litigation after the complex procedural matter
was settled by the court in plaintiff's favor. Id. In Aumiller v. University of
Del., 455 F. Supp. 676, 683 (D. Del. 1978) (§ 1988), the court viewed the "considerable additional risk" undertaken by counsel due to his investment of
"several hundred hours with no promise of remuneration" in the case, as a
factor increasing the section 1988 fee award.
The Third Circuit, when addressing the issue of contingency awards,
noted that "[t]he contingency factor would be less where liability is easily
proved than where it is questionable. Hence, the penalty fastened on the
defendant would vary in inverse proportion to the strength of the case
against him." Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977)
(Title VII). See also Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 685 (N.D. Cal.
1974), arfd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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proceedings. 177 Independent litigation which establishes the liability of the defendant in one lawsuit vitiates any "risk of litigation," in subsequent, related litigation. Contingency awards in
the later action will be minimal, if granted at all. 178 Similarly, an
official investigation made prior to institution of suit may disclose evidence which reduces the contingency factor involved in
179
prosecuting that action.
When an attorney's compensation does not depend on his
successful prosecution of the lawsuit, the rules regarding "contingency awards will, as a general rule, be inapplicable.' 8 °
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. When an attorney has received only nominal compensation for his efforts
during the litigation, 18 1 or when his recovery of a substantial fee
depends on the outcome of the lawsuit, 82 the courts will con177. See Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875, at 5618 (D.D.C.
1979) (Title VII) (early admission of culpability by defendant as to discrimination mitigates contingency); McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F.
Supp. 749, 762 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (early settlement on issue of constitutional
violation mitigates contingency); Lockheed Min. Sol. Coal. v. Lockheed
Missles & Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828, 834 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Title VII) (defendant's early statement of intent to settle substantially reduced contingency of failure and accordingly, the effect of the contingency factor).
Additionally, the Lockheed court noted that uncertainty regarding the
amount of legal fees which may be awarded by the court does not justify a
"contingency" recovery for time spent litigating the issue of fees. Id. This
holding reflects the nature of contingency awards as being justified only
where the attorney faces "the stark alternative of victory or defeat (with the
attendant threat of no payment at all)." Id.
178. See Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 487
F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I). Lindy involved civil antitrust litigation
under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1975). The Lindy court noted that the
defendants had been indicted under the criminal provisions of the Clayton
Act prior to commencement of the civil action. Those defendants who had
pleaded not guilty had been convicted before serious settlement negotiations in the civil actions had commenced. The court observed that the district court could find on remand "that the contingency was so slight ... that
an increased allowance for the contingent nature of the fee would be minimal." Id. at 168; accord, Lockheed Min. Sol. Coal. v. Lockheed Missles &
Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828, 384 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Title VII).
179. Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(contingency factor in multidistrict securities litigation pursuant to
financial collapse of Pennsylvania Central Co. was minimized by independent S.E.C. investigation which detailed malfeasance and nonfeasance of defendants).
180. See cases cited in note 168 supra.
181. McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ill. 1978)
(attorney was nominally reimbursed for some of his expenses and per
diems by NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund; court recognized that fee
approaching his normal rates was contingent on success).
182. Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 411 (D. Md.
1974), aftd, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975) (attorney was guaranteed expenses and minimal fee, but substantial fee was contingent on success on merits).
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sider these differing degrees of compensation when making a
contingency award.
In Lund v. Affleck, l8 3 a district court which awarded fees
under section 1988 held that attorneys whose efforts were entirely funded by a federally funded legal services organization
were entitled to increased recovery under the contingency doctrine. 184 This result is rather disturbing, considering the origin
and history of the contingency factor. The justification supporting its use was that an attorney should be compensated for the
risk of non-compensation undertaken in representing his client
on a contingent fee basis, and that the failure to compensate an
attorney under this factor would discourage him from represent185
ing future clients on a contingent fee basis.
In contrast, it is difficult to determine what, if anything, was
risked by the legal services organization counsel who represented the plaintiffs in Lund. The individual counsel did not
"risk" personal time and resources, as they engaged in nothing
more than their usual employment. 18 6 Nor could the legal services organization in Lund be said to have "risked" any resources, as it was a recipient of federal funds under the Legal
Services Corporation Act. 187 As such, it was prohibited from
representing fee-paying clients. 188 If an organization is not permitted to charge its clients for its services, and if it is extremely
restricted in its capacity to undertake cases which result in fee
awards, what does that organization risk in undertaking representation in one of the few types of cases which permit recovery
183. 442 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.R.I. 1977), afd, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978).
184. Id. The legal services organization in Lund did not enter into a contract for fees with the plaintiff.
The contingency doctrine, as distinguished from the contingency factor
listed in Johnson, was enunciated in precedents previously discussed. See
notes 176-82 and accompanying text supra for leading cases on the contingency doctrine.
185. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1974), afd on
other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S.
547 (1978); see Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979)
(§ 1988), where the court noted:
An attorney's regular hourly billing is based upon an expectation of
payment, win, lose or draw. If he or she will only be paid in the event of
victory, those rates will be adjusted upward to compensate for the risk
the attorney is accepting of not being paid at all.
611 F.2d at 638. In Lund, however, counsel was always assured that federal
funding would subsidize the attorney's efforts, whether the litigation resulted in a "win, lose or draw" for the plaintiffs.
186. See 442 F. Supp. at 1114.
187. Id. at 1111. The Legal Services Corporation Act is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2996 (1978).
188. See note 147 supra for the applicable regulations regarding federal
restrictions on the ability of federally funded legal services organizations to
engage in "fee-generating cases."
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189
of a fee?

The Lund court refused to consider this question, apparently on the ground that the legislative history of the Awards
Act indicated that legal services organizations were entitled to
awards of "reasonable fees."' 190 Although it does establish that
legal services organizations are entitled to reasonable fees, 191
nothing in the legislative history of section 1988 authorizes a federal court to ignore the policy considerations which underlie the
twelve Johnson factors. 192 At least four other federal courts
have indicated that the concept of "contingency" has no application where the attorneys claiming fees under section 1988 are
fully salaried by a legal services organization. 193 These decisions accurately reflect the policy rationale which justifies increased fee awards to counsel who, instead of exacting
retainers, litigate a meritorious civil rights claim on a contingent
fee basis. Blindly applying the contingency doctrine without regard for its underlying rationale will inevitably grant an undeserved windfall to an attorney. Because the courts, in awarding
189. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.4 (1978) permits a legal services organization to seek
a fee under statutes such as section 1988, once the organization is drawn
into the case by one of the regulatory conditions. The fact remains, however, that legal services organizations which receive federal funding may
not solicit such cases from the public. Therefore, litigation which permits
the collection of a fee by a federally funded legal services organization is
actually the most lucrative type of litigation available to such organizations.
190. Lund cites to one of the cases cited in the House Report on section
1988 for the proposition that the "fact [that] a legal services organization is
involved [in the litigation] is irrelevant." 442 F. Supp. at 1117. The district
court in Lund does not accurately convey the actual holding of Incarcerated
Men. That case held that the employment status of counsel, of itself,
should not be arbitrarily considered as an independent ground on which to
justify reduction of an otherwise reasonable fee. See notes 329-33 and accompanying text infra. IncarceratedMen did not instruct district courts to
ignore the organizational status of plaintiff's counsel when applying the
Johnson factors. Nothing in that case indicates that legal service organization counsel should receive increased fees under the contingency factor,
notwithstanding that such organizations have steady, uninterrupted income levels which are not affected by their workload, and simply do not risk
personal finances when litigating.
191. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 n.16 (1976) (House Report on section 1988).
192. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9444 (C.D. Cal.
1974), which was cited in the Senate Report on section 1988, S. REP. No. 1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 5908,
5913, held that an attorneys' fee award to organizational counsel should be
computed in the "traditional" manner. Nothing in Davis can be read to require a court to grant a contingency increase to a legal services organization
counsel, when none of the "traditional" policy reasons which compel such
additional awards are present.
193. See Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496, 502 n.5 (N.D. Miss. 1978);
Cole v. Tuttle, 462 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Barrett v. Kalinowski, 458 F. Supp. 689, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F.
Supp. 393, 405 (D. Colo. 1977).
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fees under section 1988, should avoid even the appearance of
overcompensating attorneys, 194 the construction of the contingency factor adopted in Lund should not be followed by other
federal courts.
Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or the Circumstances
The time limitations factor reflects the view that "[p] riority
work that delays the lawyer's other legal work is entitled to
some premium."'195 It has particular significance where an attorney is either called upon to litigate a case at a late stage in the
proceedings or to prosecute an appeal. 196 It has equal application, however, whenever swift action requiring the full utilization of counsel's time is necessary to prevent further injury to
197
his client.
As a general rule, the courts will not apply the time limitations factor in the absence of "extraordinary" time constraints
imposed on an attorney's efforts. 198 When litigation proceeds at
an orderly pace, and does not require that "priority" work be
done, this factor has little, if any, application. 99 One court declined to consider the time limitation factor in the absence of a
claim by counsel that "he was delayed on other work due to priority work with the [instant] case. ' 200 Apparently, an attorney
must claim and demonstrate the hardship he suffered due to priority work before he can expect a court to award a greater fee
under this factor. An attorney should not expect to receive premiums under the time limitations factor when the "priority" action in the lawsuit is required due to counsel's own inaction and
194. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 455 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (D. Conn. 1978).
195. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.

1974).
196. Id.
197. Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator Chem. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 522, 525 (M.D.
Fla. 1974) (antitrust action; sudden near total take-over by defendants of
plaintiff's product distribution system required immediate legal action).

198. Neely v. City of Grenada, 77 F.R.D. 484, 486 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (Title
VII).
199. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (case pro-

ceeded at orderly pace; "priority time premium" held not relevant to fee
award determination); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F.

Supp. 743, 795 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th
Cir. 1977) (Title VII); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp.
394, 411 (D. Md. 1974), affid, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034
(1975) (Em. School Aid Act).
200. Sonnenburg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875, at 5618 (D.D.C.
1979) (Title VII). See also Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 622 (S.D.
Ala. 1978) (court ordered immediate formulation and implementation of
constitutional jury selection plan and later declined to increase counsel's
fee award under this factor because counsel had not submitted request for
increased fee under the time limits factor).
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20
delay. '

The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained
The results factor was meant to focus a court's attention on
the recovery obtained by an attorney as a measure of an appropriate fee award for his services. While the monetary relief obtained for a client may be considered in setting the reasonable
20
size of an award of attorneys' fees,

2

the total amount of mone-

tary damages recovered does not set the limit on an attorney's
fee. 20 3 The Johnson opinion stated that courts should consider
not only the benefits produced for the plaintiff but also the effect
of the litigation on the public interest. 20 4 Accordingly, the results factor has been applied to increase the fee award to attorneys whose litigation significantly benefited the public interest,
notwithstanding the fact that no monetary damages were sought
20
or recovered in the suit.

5

One court has employed the results factor to reward an attorney who, in prosecuting a class action suit, vigorously
pressed the claims of his client without compromising the inter201. Clark v. Lomas &Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(equitable fund doctrine). In Clark, the court had ordered plaintiff's attorneys to bring the litigation to a close. The court noted:
IT] he court did impose certain time limitations on the parties to bring
this litigation to a close as it had been pending for a number of years.
Contrary to the Plaintiffs' assertions, the court, in reviewing these time
In a case which has
limitations, does not find them severe ....
progressed for 5 years and is one of the oldest cases on my docket, I do
not feel persuaded that the court should award "some premium" for
this effort, and though I do not ignore Plaintiff's efforts and take them

into account in my decision, I don't feel they deserve an extra bonus as
Plaintiff's suggest for any "hardship" suffered.

Id. at 656.
202. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.
1974).
203. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311, 315 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (settlement amount is not a limit on reasonable award of attorneys' fees).
204. 488 F.2d at 718. The court stated:
Although the Court should consider the amount of damages, or back
pay awarded, that consideration should not obviate court scrutiny of
the decision's effect on the law. If the decision corrects across-theboard discrimination affecting a large class of an employer's employees,
the attorney's fee award should reflect the relief granted.
Id.
205. Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (increased
award where case changed state criminal procedure rules, instituting a
magistrate system with both monetary and constitutional benefits; no
money damages were sought); Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 622
(S.D. Ala. 1978) (no damages sought, but increased award in case which
implemented constitutional jury system in that jurisdiction).
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ests of the class. 20 6 Conversely, when a court finds that counsel
compromised important rights of his clients in settling a lawsuit,
it may decline to award an increased rate of recovery under this
207
factor.
The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys
The experience factor can serve to increase or decrease the
size of an award of attorneys' fees under section 1988. The Johnson court recognized that experienced civil rights attorneys generally command higher compensation for services rendered in
civil rights litigation.20 8 However, the overall fee to be granted
under this factor may be reduced to reflect the inefficiency of
inexperienced counsel. 20 9 Yet the mere youth of an attorney
does not justify a court in decreasing an award of attorneys'
fees. Courts have stated that "[i]f a young attorney demonstrates the skill and ability, he should not be penalized for only
recently being admitted to the bar. '210 Courts accordingly
award higher fees to attorneys whose trial work demonstrates
the enhanced skill which accompanies experience, good reputation, and outstanding litigation ability. 2 1' One court did not apply the experience factor when the performance of counsel,
though deemed "adequate" by the court, was not of "such out'21 2
standing quality so as to require an increased fee.
206. Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 693 (S.D. Tex. 1976),
affd, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title VII).
207. Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875 (D.D.C. 1979) (Title
VII) (where plaintiff settled for retroactive promotion without back pay,
court declined to increase fee award under results factor).
208. 488 F.2d at 719.
209. See Barrett v. Kalinowski, 458 F. Supp. 689, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1978). In
Barrett,the court reduced the fee recovery by 25% to reflect both the inefficiency of counsel in their work product and their refusal to settle the case
on reasonable terms advanced by the defendant early in the litigation. Id.
See also Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 859 (M.D. Fla. 1975), modified on
other grounds, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) (common benefit doctrine)
(lower fee rate granted to inexperienced co-counsel).
210. Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 1977);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974);
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 741 (D.R.I. 1979); Vant Hul v. City of
Dell Rapids, 465 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D.S.D. 1979); Preston v. Mandeville, 451
F. Supp. 617, 622 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
211. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (increased
fee to skilled civil rights specialist); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry
Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 795 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d
563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title VII) (senior attorneys who possessed greater skill
than their associates were awarded higher fees); Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator
Chem. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 522, 525 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (antitrust) (counsel with
extensive trial experience in antitrust field awarded commensurate rates).
212. Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
8875, at 5618 (D.D.C.
1979) (Title VII).
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The Undesirabilityof a Case
The undesirability factor was included to permit a court to
compensate an attorney for the possible economic loss suffered
in his law practice because of community hostility toward the
attorney's prosecution of his client's civil rights claim.2 13 The
economic impact of such "hostility" on a law practice may vary
both as a function of geographic location and the passage of
21 4
time.

Courts will not apply the undesirability factor to a fee award
if an attorney is unable to demonstrate adverse economic impact on his practice due to community "hostility. ' 215 Even in
jurisdictions where attorneys who champion civil rights causes
are quite "unpopular," the undesirability factor should not result in increased fees if it appears that the attorney routinely
handles civil rights litigation. 2 16 Indeed, championing an unpop213. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.
1974); see Vant Hul v. City of Dell Rapids, 465 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D.S.D.
1979) (Title VII) (court indicated award would be increased under undesirability factor where it was recognized that attorneys' involvement in case
"could have an adverse economic impact on their future practice"); Aumiller v. University of Del., 455 F. Supp. 676, 683 (D. Del. 1978) (§ 1988) (court
recognized that "the controversial and unpopular aspects of the case had
the potential for an adverse economic impact on counsel's practice").
214. Such "hostility" undoubtedly injured the practice of the attorney
who prosecuted the first school busing claim in the South. See Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 486 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (Em.
School Aid Act). However, it was held in Morton v. Charles County Bd.of
Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394 (D. Md. 1975), affid, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975), another school desegregation case decided a year
before Swann, that no harmful effects would befall the Maryland attorneys
who prosecuted the case. 373 F. Supp. at 412. In 1977, however, a court held
that the prosecution of a school desegregation case in Denver, did indeed
cause plaintiff's attorneys to be held in disfavor with the general public.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 405 (D. Colo. 1977). Obviously,
the operation of the "undesirability" factor will turn on the facts of each
case.
215. See Neely v. City of Grenada, 77 F.R.D. 484, 487 (N.D. Miss. 1978)
(Title VII) (although court recognized that litigation was "decidedly unpopular with some elements of the Grenada community," undesirability factor
was not applied because plaintiff's attorneys were "unlikely to suffer professionally or otherwise as a result of hostility or ill feeling generated by this
litigation."); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 859 (M.D. Fla. 1975), modified
on other grounds, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) (common benefit doctrine)
(though community reaction to litigation was "unpleasant," undesirability
factor was not applied because adverse economic impact on attorney's practice could not be ascertained).
216. See Sonnenberg v. Adams, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8875, at 5618 (D.D.C.
1977) (Title VII) (attorney with Title VII litigation experience was unable to
show that prosecution of Title VII action was harmful to his practice);
Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 795 (W.D. Va.
1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title VII) (civil
rights lawyers, heavily involved in numerous civil rights actions, did not
suffer harmful economic loss by prosecuting action).
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ular civil rights cause may enhance the prestige and 17national
2
prominence of the attorney as a civil rights advocate.
At least two federal courts have indicated that the undesirability factor does not apply when the plaintiff is represented by
legal services organization counsel. 218 They apparently felt that
attorneys who are obligated to represent indigents in "unpopular" civil rights actions do not risk damage to their reputations in
the community. 219 This result stems from the fact that the applicability of the "undesirability" factor rests not on the popularity
of a cause, but on the adverse impact which the prosecution of
that cause may have had on an attorney's practice.
The Nature and Length of the ProfessionalRelationship with
the Client
The relationship factor recognizes that lawyers in private
practice often vary their fees for services rendered to clients
220
with whom they have an ongoing professional relationship.
One court, noting that fees for regular clients are often lower,
considered the absence of a professional relationship between
plaintiff and his counsel as a factor in determining a reasonable
217. Two federal court cases illustrate this principle. In Love v. Pullman
Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9167 (D. Colo. 1979) (Title VII), the court noted
that the undesirability factor was "intended to address the 'adverse' publicity and social stigma which can often follow an attorney's decision to undertake civil rights litigation." Id. at 7049. Applying this principle to the facts
of its case, the Love court noted that "what little publicity the instant lawsuit has generated has been positive." Plaintiff's counsel had in fact been
engaged to litigate another Title VII action in that jurisdiction. Id. The
Love court did not indicate that the fee awarded counsel was affected by
the "undesirability" factor.
Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 581 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1978) (Em. School Aid Act), presented a similar factual situation. In addressing the application of the undesirability factor to the case,
the Norwood court noted:
Although the case was, to say the least, quite unpopular with the
white citizenry of Mississippi, it seems unlikely that [the attorney's]
participation in the suit cost him other clients or precluded other remunerative employment. Instead, his prestige as a successful advocate in
the civil rights field was, in no small measure, enhanced by the successful outcome of this action.
410 F. Supp. at 142.
218. See McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38, 43 (W.D. Va. 1978); Cole
v. Tuttle, 462 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F.
Supp. 496, 502 n.5 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
219. See cases cited in note 218 supra. The same reasoning applies when
a judge is considering this factor in conjunction with a fee request by private counsel. One court, convinced that plaintiff's counsel had suffered "no
malevolent economic effect" as a result of the litigation, refused to apply
this factor to increase the award of attorneys' fees. Preston v. Mandeville,
451 F. Supp. 617, 622 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
220. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.
1974).
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fee. 221 Other courts, however, have completely ignored this factor where no ongoing professional relationship existed between
222
plaintiff and his counsel.
Awards in Similar Cases
The awards factor simply focuses the attention of a court on
fee awards which have been granted in similar cases, both
within and outside its jurisdiction. 223 In utilizing this factor,
courts have noted that fee awards in similar cases are instructive rather than binding. 224 The main purpose of a fee award is
to enable litigants to obtain competent counsel in civil rights
cases. 225 The fee required to attract competent counsel in Chicago or New York would not necessarily be considered "reasonable" in other parts of the country. Because the determination
of a reasonable fee must rest on the merits of each case, 226 the
significance of awards in similar cases should be kept in its
proper perspective as a helpful, but not dispositive indication of
a reasonable fee.
PROCEDURAL APPLICATION OF THE JOHNSON FACTORS

Present Procedures
The preceding discussion should illustrate that each Johnson factor has not been uniformly construed. Additionally,
there is a divergence of opinion as to the procedural application
of these factors. The majority of district courts follow the procedural approach of setting forth in the record their factual findings on the applicability of each factor. 227 Then, without more
than a hint as to the weight accorded each factor, these courts
either conjure up a lump sum award or set an hourly rate at
221. Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 795
(W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on othergrounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (Title

VII). The Younger court did not specify how it "considered" this factor.
The opinion apparently inferred that the presence of such relation would
cause an attorney to lower his fee rates; and therefore it should cause a
court to decrease the size of an award of attorneys' fees.
222. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Preston v.
Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 622 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Neely v. City of Grenada,
77 F.R.D. 484, 487 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (Title VII).
223. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.
1974).
224. Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 46 (S.D. Fla. 1979).

225. Id; see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719
(5th Cir. 1974).

226. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 412-13 (D. Colo. 1977).
227. Id.; Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. La.
1977) (Title VII); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp.
743 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977)

(Title VII).
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228
which prevailing counsel will be compensated.

A few courts have revealed the extent to which groups of
related Johnson factors influence the gross size of the fee
awarded. 229 Yet no case has been decided in which the trial
judge indicated the specific impact of each Johnson factor on the
amount of attorneys' fees awarded. District courts have power
to subjectively attach weight to each Johnson factor as they
choose. 230 Even the courts which announce the impact of groups
of factors on the size of the fee they award do not disclose why
they chose to assign that weight to those factors. 231 Because
courts do not set forth their decisional process in the record,
their fee award calculations remain largely subjective and are
232
not readily susceptible to review.
It should hardly be surprising to discover that the system
under which courts presently determine attorneys' fee awards
228. The district court opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of

Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (Em. School Aid Act), is typical. In
Swann, the district court meticulously set forth a statement of the factual
applicability of factors similar to those listed in Johnson. Counsel was apparently rated highly by the court in terms of his skill, experience, and the
results obtained in the first "busing order" case in the South. Yet, at the
close of the court's discussion, the judge summarily awarded $175,000 in
fees, for 2700 hours of legal services rendered, down from the $204,237.50
sum requested. The only justification given by the court was that the court
"preferred to err on the conservative side" when dealing with attorneys' fee
questions, so as not to "contribute unnecessarily to the overpricing of litigation." Id. at 486.
229. See, e.g., Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 688 (N.D. Cal.
1974), aftd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds,436 U.S. 547 (1978) (court considered amalgam of factors to reach
base rate of $50 per hour, for 750 hours; then awarded additional $10,000 fee
to reflect contingent fee basis on which case was undertaken, quality of
services rendered, and results obtained by litigation).
230. The Fifth Circuit recently cited Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F. Supp.
133 (N.D. Miss. 1976), affd, 581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978), with approval in Davis v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979). In Norwood, the district court
gave no indication of the weight which it assigned to the various applicable
Johnson factors. Apparently, the circuit which authored Johnson approves.
231. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd on
other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S.

547 (1978). The Stanford court noted that the case was litigated on a contingent basis, the quality of the legal services rendered was high, and the results obtained for the client were excellent. Accordingly, the court
increased the fee award by ten thousand dollars. Nowhere did the Stanford
court indicate how that figure was reached.
232. A district court decision regarding the adequacy of an award of attorneys' fees is given great deference by reviewing courts. As a general
rule, if the district court "has applied the correct criteria to the facts of the
case," the appellate courts "will defer to its exercise of discretion." Lindy
Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 116 (3d
Cir. 1976). Findings of fact on the applicability of different Johnson factors
are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. See Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 579 F.2d 916, 918 (5th Cir. 1978); Barber v.
Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978).
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can best be described as chaotic. 233 An examination of civil
rights cases decided between 1974 and 1979 reveals that the rate
of compensation awarded civil rights attorneys varied by 685
percent. 234 This variance cannot be fully explained by inflation.
233. Because the current procedures governing application of the Johnson factors do not require a court to disclose the weight attached to individual factors, it is difficult in some cases to demonstrate that the trial judge
attached any weight to any of the factors.
234. A survey of 56 recent civil rights cases reveals that rates of recovery
awarded by courts under various civil rights statutes have varied from
$137.50 per hour, to $3 per hour. The following table groups these cases by
dollar per hour rates of recovery awarded under section 1988, and similar
civil rights statutes. The 685% variance figure was derived by comparison of
the highest fee rate awarded ($137.50 per hour) and the lowest fee rate ($20
per hour) sustained on appeal.
The monetized figure appearing in the first column of the table represents
the highest hourly rate of recovery awarded to an attorney in a civil rights
case. Thus, for example, if one of three plaintiffs attorneys received an
hourly rate of $75 per hour, that case will appear in the "$75" column,
notwithstanding the fact that other plaintiff's attorneys involved in that litigation may have been recompensed at lesser rates. The full citation of the
case appears to the right of the first column, along with a parenthetical
which identifies the fee shifting provision under which the fee award was
granted. The actual fee rates granted appear beneath the citation. Each
indented line represents the fee granted to individual attorneys. The first
symbol in each line indicates the employment status of the attorney.
"(PA)" indicates that the attorney was in private practice.
"(LSO)" indicates that the attorney was employed by a legal services organization.
"(FF/LSO)" indicates that the attorney was employed by a legal services
organization funded under the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2996 (Supp. 1979).
The following monetized figure represents the fee rate awarded for differentiated tasks within the litigation. Those "tasks" are indicated by the following symbols:
(in) indicates "in court" work.
(out) indicates "out-of-court" work.
(conf) indicates time spent in conference with other attorneys, witnesses, or the client.
(deps) indicates time spent taking depositions.
(App) indicates work done at the appellate level.
(travel) indicates compensation for travel time.
(inf.comm.) indicates time spent in informal communications with
other attorneys, witnesses, or the client.
(non legal) indicates compensation for the performance of non-legal
tasks.
(ov) indicates that the court assigned an overall rate of recovery to the
attorney, which did not differentiate between the type of work rendered.
TABLE
$140-101
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979)

(§ 1988).
-(PA)
-(PA)
-(PA)

$137.50 (in), $82.50 (out).
$66 (ov).
$44 (ov).
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Nor can it be attributed to geographical disparities in market
$100-89
$90-81

$80-76

$75-66

$65-61

$60-56

NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(LSO) $100 (ov).
Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $90 (ov).
Cruz v. Beto, 453 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (§ 1988)
-(PA) $90 (in), $75 (out), $35 (inf. comm.), $10
(travel).
-(PA) $70 (in), $60 (out).
-(PA) $50 (in), $40 (out), $35 (inf. comm.), $10
(travel).
-(LSO) $60 (out), $35 (inf. comm.).
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732 (D.R.I. 1979)
(§ 1988).
-(LSO) $80 (in), $75 (out).
-(LSO) $75 (in), $70 (out).
-(LSO) $70 (in) & (out), $30 (non-legal).
-(LSO) $60 (in) & (out), $30 (non-legal).
Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $75 (ov).
-(PA) $65 (ov).
Boe v. Colello, 447 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $75 (ov).
Drew v. Brierton, 443 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $75 (ov).
Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 441 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.N.C.
1977) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $75 (ov).
-(PA) $60 (ov).
-(PA) $55 (ov).
Preston v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Ala. 1978)
(§ 1988).
-(PA) $65 (ov).
-(PA) $35 (in), $25 (out), $15 (conf).
Phillips v. Moore, 441 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $61 (ov).
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (private attorney general doctrine), affirmed through retroactive
application of § 1988, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
-(PA) $64 (ov).
Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1979) (§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $60 (ov).
-(FF/LSO) $55 (ov).
Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $60 (ov), $50 (App.).
Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $60 (in), $40 (out).
-(PA) $30 (ov).
Lackey v. Bowling, No. 78 C 1980 (N.D. Ill., filed Apr. 9, 1979)
(§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $60 (ov).
-(FF/LSO) $50 (ov).
-(FF/LSO) $40 (ov).
Meisel v. Kremens, 80 F.R.D. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $60 (ov) (work done after June, 1975), $40 (ov)
(work done prior to June, 1975).
Stephenson v. Simon, 448 F. Supp. 708 (D.D.C. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(LSO) $60 (ov).

The John Marshall Law Review
value rates.

[Vol. 13:331

235

Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1977)

(§ 1988).
-(PA) $60 (ov).
Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub
nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Title

VII).

$55-51

-(PA) $60 (ov).
-(PA) $35 (ov)..
-(PA) $30 (ov).
Lockheed Min. Sol. Coal. v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co.,
406 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Title VII).
-(PA) $60 (ov).
-(PA) $42 (ov).
Cooper v. Curtis, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 809 (D.D.C. 1978)
(Title VII).
-(PA) $55 (ov).
McMullen v. Claytor, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7970 (D.D.C.
1977) (Title VII).
-(PA) $52 (ov).
Guerra v. Roma Ind. School Dist., 444 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Tex.

1977) (§ 1988).

$50-46

-(PA) $55 (in), $40 (out).
Pace v. Califano, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7547 (D.D.C. 1977)
(Title VII).
-(PA) $54 (ov).
-(PA) $52 (ov).
Rote v. Hall, No. C-76-228 (E.D. Wash., ified May 14, 1979)

(§ 1988).

-(LSO) $50 (ov).
-(LSO) $35 (ov).
Vant Hul v. City of Dell Rapids, 465 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.D.
1979) (Title VII).
-(PA) $50 (ov).
Keown v. Storti, 456 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $50 (ov) (base rate award only, final fee
subject to reduction for "reasonableness" at subsequent hearing).
Willett v. Chester Water Auth., 447 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Pa.

1978) (§ 1988).

$45-41

-(LSO) $50 (ov).
-(LSO) $30 (ov).
White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $50 (ov).
-(FF/LSO) $40 (ov).
-(FF/LSO) $25 (ov).
Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D.
La. 1977) (Title VII).
-(PA) $50 (ov).
Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Miss. 1976),
aff'd, 581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (Em. School Aid Act).
-(PA) $50 (App.), $40 (in), $35 (out), $30 (deps), $20
(conf.).
Cole v. Tuttle, 462 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(LSO) $43 (ov).
Gagne v. Maher, 455 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Conn. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 44 (1979) (§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $45 (ov).
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Commentators have suggested that the inconsistent man-

$40-36

Neely v. City of Grenanda, 77 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Miss. 1978)
(Title VII).
-(PA) $45 (in) & (out), $30 (non-legal).
-(PA) $35 (in) & (out), $30 (non-legal).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977)
(§ 1988).
-(LSO) $45 (in), $35 (out).
-(LSO) $45 (ov).
-(LSO) $35 (ov).
-(PA) $35 (ov).
Schmidt v. Schubert, 433 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Wis. 1977)
(§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $45 (ov).
Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Miss. 1978)
(§ 1988).
-(PA) $40 (ov).
Dean v. Gladney, 451 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $40 (in), $25 (out), $5 (travel).
-(PA) $30 (in), $20 (out), $5 (travel).
Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)

(§ 1988).

$35-31

$30-26

-(LSO) $40 (ov).
McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 424 F. Supp. 1382
(N.D. Miss. 1976) (§ 1988).
-(PA) $40 (in), $25 (out).
Latham v. Chandler, 406 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (42
U.S.C. § 1973 l(e) (1978), Voting Rights Act).
-(PA) $40 (in), $20 (out).
Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1977)
(§ 1988).
-(PA) $35 (in), $17.50 (out). (Note: the Rainey court
vacated an order of the district court awarding $5.75
(in), $2.87 (out). The fee rates noted above were rates
imposed by the court of appeals).
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Ref., 466 F. Supp. 367 (N.D.
Iowa 1979) (§ 1988).
-(LSO) $35 (ov).
McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Va. 1978)
(§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $31 (ov).
Card v. Dempsey, 445 F. Supp. 942 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $31 (ov).
Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Ext. Serv., 378 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.
Miss. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.
1976) (Title VII).
-(LSO) $35 (ov).
Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977) (Title VII).
-(PA) $27 (ov).
Barrett v. Kalinowski, 458 F. Supp. 689 (M.D. Pa. 1978)
(§ 1988).
-(LSO) $30 (ov).
-(LSO) $22 (ov).
-(LSO) $16 (ov).
-(PA) $23 (ov).
Thom v. Aggrey, 455 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1977), appeal
dismissed, 595 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1979) (§ 1988).
-(LSO) $30 (ov).
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ner in which district courts determine attorneys' compensation
under civil rights statutes may act as a disincentive to private
representation of litigants under those statutes. 236 A major policy goal of section 1988 is to encourage private attorneys to litigate the claims of individuals with limited monetary
resources, 23 7 thus removing financial barriers to the prosecution
of meritorious civil rights claims. 238 Yet, under the present sys$25-21

Dilda v. Quern, No. 77 C 115 (N.D. Ill., filed Apr. 3, 1979)
(§ 1988).
-(FF/LSO) $25 (ov).
Davis v. Reed, 72 F.R.D. 644 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (Em. School

$20-6

Aid Act).
-(PA) $25 (out), $20 (travel).
Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Sep. School Dist., 395 F. Supp. 304
(N.D. Miss. 1975) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), Em. School Aid Act).
-(LSO) $24 (ov).
EEOC v. Enterprise Assoc. Steamfitters, Local 638, 542 F.2d
579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977) (Title VII).
-(FF/LSO)

$5-1

$0.00

$20 (ov).

Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979) (§ 1988) (CAUTION: the fee rate below was awarded by the district court.
The Francia court held the award to be inadequate, vacated
the fee award order, and remanded the cause for further proceedings).
-(PA) $2.9 (ov).
Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1978) (§ 1988)
(CAUTION: the fee rate below was awarded by the district
court. The Greminger court held the award to be inadequate,
vacated the fee award order, and remanded the cause with instructions to award a minimum fee of $7,500.00).
-(PA) $1.27 above litigation expenses (ov). Sum
awarded by the district court below was $1,250.00.

235. Inflation may account for some of the variance in rates awarded. It
cannot, however, be said to be a significant contributing factor. Of the 56
cases cited in note 234 supra, the earliest reported decision, Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), involved a fee
award rate of $50/hour. That rate would lie roughly in the middle of a bell
curve which could be drawn from the fee awards in the other cases. The
remaining 55 cases were decided between 1976 and 1979. Inflation could not
have had a 685% effect on fee scales during that time. Additionally, it can
be noted that the rates of recovery awarded do not appear to vary geographically to any significant extent.
236. See generally Berger, CourtAwarded Attorneys' Fees." What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977).
237. The House Report on section 1988 provided:
Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot
afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts.
In authorizing an award of reasonable attorney's fees, [section 1988] is
designed to give such persons effective access to the judicial process
where their grievances can be resolved according to law.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
238. The Senate Report on section 1988 provides:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who
must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a
lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and
if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed
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tem governing fee award determinations, the private attorney is
not assured that he will be adequately compensated for his efforts. First, the attorney must successfuly prosecute the cause
of action in the trial court and maintain the favorable judgment
through the appellate process before he is entitled to any attorneys' fees under section 1988.239 Then, the extent of his compensation may depend largely on the subjective whim of a trial
judge, whose actual determination regarding the size of the fee
award is never more than alluded to.240 Indeed, why would an
attorney take time off from his lucrative, private practice in order to engage in civil rights litigation, where his fee recovery depends entirely on the subjective, and largely unreviewable,
24 1
determinations of a district court judge?
Private attorney representation of section 1988 litigants is
not aided by the fact that many district court judges are compelled on remand from appellate courts to set forth an explanation of their fee award determinations. In such cases, an
attorney who is unsatisfied with the fee awarded by the district
court must appeal. The total absence in the record of any explanation of the basis for the award of fees will result in a remand
to the district court with instructions to apply the Johnson factors. 2 4 2 Thus, the claiming attorney must suffer the delays of litigating through the appellate process before he even receives a
record on which to appeal the adequacy of the award itself. The
possibility of such a scenario cannot "encourage" private attorneys to litigate section 1988 cases on a contingent fee basis. Unfortunately, this type of double appeal is not an isolated
occurrence. A line of cases from the Fifth Circuit, which
authored Johnson, reveals the reluctance of some district courts
to follow its procedural requirements.
with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what

it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEWS 5908, 5910.
239. Because section 1988 fees are granted to "prevailing parties" only,

interim awards of attorneys' fees are granted upon the posting of bond by
the successful litigant. Howard v. Phelps, 433 F. Supp. 374, 377 (E.D. La.
1978). Thus, the "prevailing party" is not assured that he may retain the
award until he finally prevails following appellate review. See note 24

supra.

240. See note 228 and accompanying text supra.
241. Of course, many attorneys engage in pro bono publico representation of indigent clients in civil rights cases. Such pro bono efforts, however,
had not met the needs of potential civil rights litigants prior to passage of
section 1988. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
242. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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In Davis v. Fletcher,243 decided in 1979, the Fifth Circuit vacated a district court order on the issue of attorneys' fees. In a
brief statement, the district court had asserted its familiarity
with Johnson and indicated that it had considered the "requisite
factors."'244 Without further analysis, plaintiff's counsel was
awarded the full amount of fees requested. In remanding the
case, the Fifth Circuit held that determination of a reasonable
fee under Johnson requires something more than "a meaningless exercise in parroting and answering each of Johnson's
twelve criteria, but some assurance that the court has arrived at
'245
a just compensation based upon appropriate standards.
The court cited nine of its prior decisions in holding that the
district court's summary treatment of the Johnson factors constituted an abuse of discretion. 246 In each one, an order setting
the size of an award of attorneys' fees was vacated because the
247
trial court failed to follow the procedural mandate of Johnson.
It is difficult to determine why the Fifth Circuit has experienced continuous difficulties in achieving district court adherence to the procedural requirements of Johnson. It is
conceivable that district courts, with hopelessly overburdened
dockets, simply handle the issue of attorneys' fees in summary
fashion in order to adjudicate pressing substantive cases and issues. If the parties choose to appeal the adequacy of the attorneys' fee award, the district court can award the same fee on
remand, supported, of course, by the factual findings which
Johnson demands. This hypothesis cannot be proved, because
no case has been located in which a district court explained why
it ignored the procedural requirements of Johnson. The fact remains, however, that the failure of district courts to comply with
243. Davis v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979).

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Two cases, Evans v. Seaman, 496 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1974) and Baxter
v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1033 (1974), were decided by district courts prior to the issuance of the John-

son opinion. Those cases were remanded to the trial courts for reconsideration of the attorneys' fees issue in light of Johnson. In the remaining seven
cases, however, the district courts had either ignored Johnson, or, like the

trial court in Davis, gave cursory treatment to its procedural requirements.

The district courts in five of the decisions had failed to detail their findings of fact regarding the Johnson factors. Those cases included: EEOC v.
Eastex, Inc., 568 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1978); Premier Corp. v. Serrano, 565 F.2d
1353 (5th Cir. 1977); Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 270 (5th
Cir. 1977); In re First Colonial Corp. of Am., 554 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1975).
The other two cases which gave summary treatment to the Johnson factors were Sweeney v. Vindale Corp., 574 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978) and Miller
v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 515 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1975).
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to vex the Fifth Circuit, 24 8 as well
these requirements continues
24 9
as other federal circuits.
The present procedures governing judicial awards of attorneys' fees necessitates modification. Both commentators and a
few courts have suggested that trial judges should look to the
market rate in the locality for legal services as an objective starting point in their calculation of the value of an attorney's efforts. 250 This approach, however, is less than satisfactory. The
United States Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,251 recently declared a county bar association's minimum
fee schedule to be an antitrust violation. Thus, a reliable indicator of the "going rate" for legal services in a community is no
longer available.
Of course, the courts are not precluded from considering the
affidavits of local attorneys as to their billing rates. 252 However,
the affidavits of a few, disinterested attorneys cannot possibly
enable a court to form a rational opinion regarding market rates
for legal services in populous communities. The courts have
noted that the rate at which an attorney bills his clients depends
on a wide assortment of considerations peculiar to the individual circumstances surrounding the attorney/client relationship
and the nature of the litigation. 253 The "normal billing rate" of
an attorney can hardly be said to provide an objective indication
248. See Fain v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 564 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977);

Wolf v. Frank, 555 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1977); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc.,
516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975).
249. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979);
Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978); Altman v.
Central of Ga. Ry., 580 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d
645 (1st Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978); Kerr v.
Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
951 (1976).
250. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). See generally Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys'
Fees: What Is "Reasonable"? 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977).
251. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
252. It is currently the practice of the courts to collect such information
by affidavit, as an aid to their determination of a reasonable fee award
through use of the Johnson factors. See note 157 and accompanying text
supra.
253. One federal court noted:
There is no standard rate in this community even as between lawyers
of comparable ability and responsibility. Some lawyers take into account their reputation and level of past earnings. All are concerned
with whether the work has distracted them from other obligations. Results always affect the client's receptivity to the fee suggested. The
practices of immediate competitors and a feel for the clients' ability to
pay must always be recognized.
National Council of Comm. Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger, 387 F.
Supp. 991, 996 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 546 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
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of the actual rate at which he will bill his clients. 25 4 Furthermore, nothing prevents district court judges from subjectively
forming irreconcilable conclusions as to going market rates for
legal services in a locality. Thus, consideration of market rates
can offer little objectivity to the procedures under which the size
of an award of attorneys' fees is determined.
The Cost Plus Rationale
In 1978, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit issued an opinion in Copeland v. Marshall255 which advocated a novel approach to the determination of a reasonable
award of attorneys' fees. In Copeland, the court of appeals reviewed the summary, unexplained action of a trial court which
256
reduced the fee requested by plaintiff's counsel by 20 percent.
The reviewing court noted that the law firm representing the
plaintiff had failed to submit documentation, required by Johnson, differentiating between the time spent by individual attorneys on different tasks during the litigation. 257 Accordingly, the
Copeland court held that the fee granted by the district court
25 8
was not based on a proper evidentiary foundation.
In addition, the court stated that the district judge had failed
to adequately set forth the basis for the award of $160,000 in attorneys' fees. The trial court opinion had made only passing reference to the Johnson factors, 259 so the appellate panel was
254. An affidavit disclosing an attorney's "usual billing schedule" is evidence of the rates that an attorney, in the average case, can charge his client. But as noted in Weinberger, a number of circumstances peculiar to the

attorney/client relationship influence the size of the actual fee to be
awarded. Similarly, section 1988 does not require courts to award successful litigants the "normal" or "average" billing rates of his counsel or average
community rates. Rather, the fee awarded under section 1988 should be reasonable, in light of the circumstances of each case. Drew v. Brierton, 443 F.
Supp. 389, 391 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Although information outlining the normal

billing rates of an attorney is helpful in determining a reasonable fee for
that attorney, see note 158 and accompanying text supra, such information
should not form the foundation for an award to be paid by an involuntary
and unwilling section 1988 defendant.
255. Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated, 48

U.S.L.W. 2017 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1979) (rehearing en banc ordered).
256. 594 F.2d at 247.
257. See note 44 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of evidentiary burdens placed on fee claiming counsel under Johnson.
258. 594 F.2d at 254-55.
259. The trial court in Copeland,like the Fifth Circuit district court opinions cited in notes 247-48 supra, accorded cursory treatment to the Johnson
factors. The applicability to the Copeland litigation of each factor was not
discussed by the trial court. 594 F.2d at 256. Moreover, there are indications
that the fee awarded, even considering the 20% reduction from the requested sum, was grossly excessive.
The Copeland litigation provided limited relief to a class of thirty-six
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unable to meaningfully review the adequacy of the fee
awarded. 260 In remanding the case, the appellate court suggested a procedural format under which the district court could
reach "a more solidly validated conclusion" in its fee award determination. 26 1 In effect, it was suggested that the district judge
consider the cost incurredby the attorneys in litigating the lawsuit as an objective starting point in its fee award determination.
The court of appeals recognized that although attorneys typically assert "the value of [their] attorneys' work to the client
... [they] never reveal the value of the attorneys' work to the
firm. ' 262 Yet, the court noted that considerations of the cost of
engaging in litigation is "at the heart of the [law] firm's own accounting process as a business concern. '263 It stated that this
information "should also be considered by a court when called
upon to exercise judgment in determining a reasonable attor'264
neys' fee.
In addition, the reviewing court specifically outlined the
manner in which its cost plus formula should be utilized. Considerations of the expense incurred by the firm in prosecuting
the litigation would enable a district court to reimburse the attorneys for their costs. 265 Then, with reference to the factors
listed in Johnson,266 a trial court could award the attorneys "a

reasonable and controllable margin for profit.

'267

In applying this "cost plus profit" formula, a district court
could calculate a reasonable attorneys' fee in the following manner. In reimbursing a law firm for the services of one of its associates, three sums would be considered. First, the firm would
female employees of HEW. Yet the $160,000 fee actually awarded plaintiff's
counsel was three times greater than any prior award for Title VII litigation
in the District of Columbia Circuit. Brief for Appellant at 35, Copeland v.
Marshall, 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
260. Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated, 48
U.S.L.W. 2017 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1979) (rehearing en banc ordered).
261. 594 F.2d at 260.
262. Id. at 251.

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. The Copeland opinion does not cite directly to Johnson. However, it
does cite Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The
District of Columbia Circuit had embraced the Johnson factors and procedures in Evans. Id. at 188. Therefore, the citation by the Copeland panel to
Evans is synonymous to a citation to the factors and procedures associated
with Johnson.
267. 594 F.2d at 251. The Copeland panel did not define the limits of a
"reasonable and controllable margin for profit." Rather, the panel expressed the belief that the use of this "cost plus" formula would result in
the award of such a profit.
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receive an amount commensurate with the salary paid to the associate during the litigation. 268 Second, the firm would be reimbursed for its overhead costs, including rent, supplies, services,
secretarial and paralegal help, incurred in maintaining the associate in the firm during the litigation. 269 Third, the award would
reflect a return of profit to the partnership.27 0 Johnson already
requires attorneys to keep detailed records of the time they expend in the litigation. 271 The availability of such records would
enable a court to allocate reimbursement for expenses and
profit on an hourly or annual basis.272 The overhead costs of a
partner would be calculated in the same manner, although the
Copeland court of appeals noted that these costs may be greater
273
for a partner than for associates.
The evidentiary and procedural requirements of the "cost
plus" formula do not impose severe burdens on attorneys or district courts. The evidentiary information required by the
formula should be readily available to conscientious attorneys.
It has been noted that attorneys are required under prevailing
practice to document the time they expend in litigation. In addition, those who calculate their income tax correctly should have
access to information outlining overhead costs on an hourly or
274
annual basis.
Legal services organizations should be capable of fulfilling
the evidentiary requisites of "cost plus." Federal income tax
regulations require privately funded, tax exempt organizations,
such as the NAACP, to maintain records of their overhead and
expenditures. 275 Legal services organizations which receive federal funding under the Legal Services Corporation Act must
276
submit to bi-monthly itemized audits of their expenditures.
268. Id.
269. Id. The Copeland panel opinion did not indicate that it meant this
list of expenses to be exclusive. However, most reasonably incurred costs

of providing legal services should be encompassed by categories of "rent,

clerical, paralegal aid, supplies and services" costs.
270. Id.
271. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.

272. It would perhaps be easiest to calculate this sum on a pro rata annual basis. For example, if an attorney expends 400 hours on a case and

expends 1600 billable hours during a year, a court should be able to reimburse that attorney for 25% of his annual overhead and profit expectations.

273. 594 F.2d at 251.
274. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6000-1 (1978) (requires taxpayers to keep permanent records sufficient to establish amount of gross income, business expense deductions, credits, etc.).
275. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2 (1978)

(requires tax exempt organizations,

such as legal services organizations, to maintain records of gross receipts
and disbursements).

276. The Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996h(c) (1) (Supp.
1978), codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1602 (1978), requires recipient organizations to
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In short, counsel, whether in private practice or employed by legal services organizations, should have access to the type of
financial information required by the cost plus formula.
Cost plus would not impose significant proceduralburdens
on either district courts or attorneys. Copeland does not demand a line by line submission of each litigation expense item
incurred by an attorney. 277 The Copeland court noted, in a supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing, that "[i]t is the average overhead cost per attorney" which is to be considered by the
district judge. 278 The court further explained that a law firm
could submit the required information by affidavit. 279 Detailed
accounting data would not be requested by a district court, unless the expenses claimed were "drastically out of line" with
those of other firms.

280

The Copeland court did not advance its cost plus formula to
limit the fees awarded by district courts under civil rights statutes. Rather, it was indicated, on denial of rehearing, that "the
cost plus reasonable profit formula should be looked upon as a
formula for arriving at afair market value standard for the work
in Title VII cases. It is not necessarily something different from
'28 1
the market value standard.
It is clear that the "cost plus" formula is a rational framework under which district courts can accurately determine reasonable awards of attorneys' fees. Calculation of counsel's base
expense in litigating the action permits a court to determine the
lowest possible fee which could be awarded in the case. 282 Consideration of market rates billed for the rendition of exemplary
legal services permits a court to ascertain the maximum reasonsubmit comprehensive financial information regarding their financial operation, as a condition to their receipt of federal funding. The Legal Services
Corporation: Audit and Accounting Guide For Recipients and Auditors,
published at 41 Fed. Reg. 29958, July 20, 1976, (ch. 5, § 1), requires such organizations to submit to bi-monthly audits of their receipts and disbursements.
277. See Copeland v. Marshall, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,038 (D.C. Cir.
June 29, 1979) (supplemental opinion by original panel on denial of rehearing by that panel).
278. Id. at 11,219.
279. Id. at 11,221. Right of privacy infringement is thereby avoided.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 11,218.
282. Id. A trial court must necessarily make a finding as to this base
sum, if it is following the Copeland procedures correctly. A trial court's factual findings regarding the amount of expenses incurred by counsel would
then be subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, normally applied to any factual findings on the Johnson factors. See note 232 and accompanying text supra.
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able fee which could be awarded in that case. 283 The district
court would then have an objectively established framework
within which the Johnson factors could be subjectively applied
in setting a "reasonable" fee. 284 District courts would retain the
flexibility required to fashion awards of attorneys' fees to the
circumstances of an individual lawsuit. 28 5 At the same time,
however, cost plus would impose an objective check on a district
court's discretion. In sum, the cost plus formula provides a rational procedure for the calculation of a judicial award of reasonable attorneys' fees. It should be adopted and applied by federal
courts at least until a more desirable alternative is devised.
Cost Plus and Section 1988 Fee Awards
Nothing in the cost plus rationale precludes its application
to other statutory and equitable mechanisms under which
courts are currently empowered to award reasonable attorneys'
fees. 2 8 6 An examination of the legislative history of section 1988
reveals that the use of the cost plus formula under that section
would not only be permissible, but perhaps required.
The Senate Report on section 1988 merely refers to Johnson
as a case setting forth "appropriate standards" governing a judicial award of attorneys' fees. 287 It cites three additional cases
which, in the opinion of the Senate, applied the Johnson factors
"correctly. '288 Each one employed a somewhat different proce283. This information is currently available under existing Johnson procedures. See notes 156-57 and accompanying text supra.
284. Nothing in Copeland would preclude the award of a fee which ex-

ceeded the "highest" rates in a community, given exceptional skill, performance, and results obtained by counsel.
285. Because it can subjectively determine the return of profit to be
awarded counsel, the court retains a great deal of discretion in determining
the size of the fee to be awarded. However, cost plus would place definable
boundaries on the manner in which a trial court exercises its discretion.
Such constraints are absent in the status quo.
286. The Copeland panel recognized on rehearing that the cost plus
formula could be applied in suits against private defendants, as well as in
suits against the United States government. The panel noted:
Our previous opinion did not say that the formula should be applied in any case except those in which the Government is a defendant
in a Title VII action, but the petitioners may be correct in claiming
there is no sound reason why the formula should not apply when a private party is the defendant-except, as previously noted, there may be

an understandable punitive element in awarding attorneys' fees in a
case in which a private company has been guilty of racial or sex discrimination.
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,038, at 11,221-22.
287. S.REP.No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE
& AD.
288. Id.

CONG.

NEWS

5908, 5913.
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289
dural approach to the application of the Johnson factors.
This may indicate that Congress did not intend to restrict the

289. The first case cited by the Senate Report, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (Em. School Aid Act), is
indistinguishable from Johnson in its approach. The Swann court, like
Johnson, merely stated a number of factors which could be used in determining a reasonable fee award. These factors included: (1) the results obtained; (2) the difficulty and novelty of the case; (3) fees paid to opposing
counsel; (4) time and labor involved; (5) loss of other business; (6) fees
customarily charged for similar services; (7) fixed or contingent fee; (8) reputation, experience, and ability of plaintiff's counsel; and (9) expenses and
advancements. The Swann court applied these factors in the manner suggested by Johnson. Id.
The second case cited by the Senate Report, Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (Title VII), also cited a
list of factors similar to those stated by Johnson. Thus, the approach of the
Davis court was similar, though less detailed, than that taken in Johnson
and Swann.
It is the third case, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal.
1974), affd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds,436 U.S. 547 (1978) (Title VII), which takes a recognizably different
approach to the issue of reasonable fee determination. The Stanford court
noted that Johnson offered "a useful catalogue of factors" to consider, but it
did not "indicate ...

how a district court is to use the list ...

to attach a

relative weight to the different factors in determining an award." 64 F.R.D.
at 682.
To remedy this problem, the Stanford court borrowed a procedural
structure which had been used in cases involving equitable fund doctrine
awards and applied the Johnson factors within this framework. The first
step called for a determination of the time spent on the case. Here, as in
Johnson, the court examined the time records submitted by plaintiff's counsel and determined what hours to allow or disallow. Once the number of
compensable hours was determined, the Stanford court attached a value to
that time. It determined that value through consideration of a number of
Johnson factors, including the attorney's normal billing rates, the usual
rates in the locality, the skill demonstrated by the attorney, and his experience in civil rights litigation. Id. at 684-85. Once the court reached a base
value for the attorney's services, expressed in dollar per hour form, the
court considered two other factors which modified the base rate.
First, the court would increase the base rate if the attorney had litigated
the case on a contingent fee basis. Id. at 685. Then the court would either
increase or decrease the base rate to reflect the quality of the legal services
rendered. Here, the Stanford court applied the Johnson factors dealing
with the "novelty and difficulty of the questions" and "the amount involved
and the results obtained." These factors, as expressed by both Johnson and
Stanford, can operate to increase or decrease an award of fees. Id. at 68687. Finally, the Stanford court simply multiplied the adjusted base rate by
the hours allowed to reach the amount of the fee to be awarded. Id. at 68788.
Stanford, like Johnson, did not delineate the effect of individual factors
on the size of the fee awarded. The court simply "considered" the different
factors, reached an hourly rate, and multiplied this rate by the hours allowed. Thus, in effect, Stanford did not depart from the substance of the
Johnson holding. It merely applied the Johnson factors within a different
procedural format. If an attorney understands how the Johnson factors are
utilized, he can fashion his petition for fees to suit either those courts which
simply follow Johnson, or those courts which prefer the more structured
Stanford approach.
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judiciary to any one rigid procedural format. Clearly, it suggests
that Johnson's precedential impact is centered in the factors it
delineated and not in the manner in which they are to be considered by a district court.
The difference between "cost plus" and traditional fee
award determinations is simply one of procedure. Under existing law, district courts consider the Johnson factors collectively to reach the dollar per hour rate of recovery awarded an
attorney. 290 Under "cost plus," these factors would be used to
calculate the return of profit to be awarded on an hourly basis.
Under both procedures, judges may subjectively apply these
factors within the limits of their discretion. 291 Thus, the use of
''cost plus" would not be inconsistent with the legislative history
of section 1988.
Additionally, it can be argued that the cost plus formula
should be employed by the courts for the same reasons which
prompted the judiciary to adopt the factors listed in Johnson.
The Johnson factors originated in the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility. 292 The Fifth Circuit instructed the lower
court to consider those factors so that attention would be focused on the same considerations which influence the billing
practices of private attorneys in the open market. 293 Similarly, it
is clear that consideration of the cost of providing legal services
has some impact on these billing practices.
The ability of private practitioners to deduct items of business expense from their gross income, under the Federal Income Tax regulations, undoubtedly makes private attorneys
aware of their expenses. 294 Legal periodicals inform the private
295
practitioner of practical ways to reduce overhead expenses.
This abundance of current legal literature reflects the growing
interest of private attorneys, as businessmen, in controlling and
reducing their expenses. 296 Books discussing the managerial as290.

Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated, 48

U.S.L.W. 2017 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1979) (rehearing en banc granted).
291. As under the status quo, the factual findings regarding the Johnson
factors and the calculation of the expense items of a fee claiming attorney

would be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See
note 232 supra.
292. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
293. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
294.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.62- (c)(1) (1978) (procedure for including items

of business expense as deductions for federal income tax purposes).
295. See, e.g., Kelley, How Much Does It Cost To Employ An Associate?, 5
LEGAL ECON. 12 (Mar./Apr. 1979); Maskaleris, NationalLaw Firms,5 LEGAL
ECON. 38 (July/Aug. 1979); Porter, Watching Your Expenses, 5 LEGAL ECON.
19 (July/Aug. 1979); Ulrich, Managing An Effective Legal Assistant Pro-

gram, 5 LEGAL ECON. 35 (Jan./Feb. 1979).
296. See Brill, The horrible truth is, you're runninga business. Organiza-
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pects of maintaining a private practice contain sections which
outline a "cost plus" method of calculating minimum billing
rates. 297 It cannot be denied that at least some attorneys currently employ a "cost plus" analysis in their billing determinations.
Moreover, it appears that current competitive trends affecting the practice of law may require the bar to undertake a "cost
plus" analysis of their own practices. The number of attorneys
in this country seems astronomical. 298 The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
swept away anticompetitive restraints which had been imposed
by minimum fee scales. 299 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,300 decided by the Court in 1977, eliminated a significant barrier to
competition in the legal profession by extending first amendment protection to the attorney's right to advertise. 30 1 Attorneys currently appear on television screens, hawking cut rate
fees for legal services. 3 0 2 This advertising has apparently in30 3
creased consumer awareness of the cost of hiring an attorney.
Lawyers may be forced to adjust their billing rates for certain
30 4
legal services in order to remain competitive in the market.
The determination of overhead costs and profit expectations will
play an important role in an attorney's decision to adjust his
30 5
rates to advertised levels.
tion of the Law Office, 65 A.B.A.J. 2A (Mar. 1979) (special "pull-out" section
of March issue).
297. See M. ALTMAN & R. WEIL, HOW TO MANAGE YOUR LAW OFFICE § 4.02
(1979); J. FOONBERG, HOW TO START AND BUILD A LAW PRACTICE, 69-70
(1976).
298. The legal profession is now the fastest growing profession, B.N.A.,
Futurelaw,at 5 (1979). One out of every 484 persons in the United States is
a lawyer. Id. This development, coupled with the abandonment of minimum fee scales and the appearance of legal advertising, see notes 299-300
and accompanying text infra, should work to make the practice of law more
competitive.
299. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
300. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
301. Id. The Bates opinion merely removed the blanket prohibition on
advertising by lawyers. The Bates Court holding was that the plaintiffs had
a first amendment right to truthfully advertise rates for the rendition of
"routine legal services" in a newspaper. Id. at 384.
302. Attorneys across the country have taken to the television media to
advertise the type of "routine legal services" mentioned in Bates. See Allison, Advertising: Legal Clinics Have Found It Pays, 5 LEGAL ECON. 35
(May/June 1979).

303. Id.
304. Lawyers will make such adjustments in their billing rates, if they
engage in such "routine legal services."
305. It is mere common sense that an attorney will not undertake representation in a case, unless he believes that he can make a profit off time so
expended.
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There is evidence that even large corporate clients are becoming more aware of the costs of legal services. 30 6 Thus, the
reality of increased competition in the legal profession has had
an effect on the largest law firms, as well as on the sole practitioner. Attorneys will be forced to bill their clients with an30 eye
7
toward their future expenses, if they do not do so already.
The belief that judicial awarding of fees should resemble
private fee billing determinations prompted the Fifth Circuit to
set forth the twelve Johnson factors.30 8 Courts, in their efforts to
award reasonable fees, should similarly consider the costs incurred by that attorney; not merely because "cost plus" is a ra-

tional procedure for determining a reasonable fee, but because
the formula, like the Johnson factors, is based on billing practices in the open market.
Cost Plus and Fee Awards to OrganizationalCounsel
Legal services organizations were quick to voice their opposition to the Copeland decision. Twenty-four legal services
foundations filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the plaintiff's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en
banc.30 9 The underlying apprehension of amici is that adoption
306. See M. ALTMAN &R. WEIL, How To MANAGE YOUR LAW OFFICE § 4.03,
page 4-13.3 (1979). Altman and Weil ran a survey of 150 large non-legal corporations in 1973. Of the 57 corporations responding, 51% preferred to be
billed "entirely on the basis of time," by outside attorneys. 40% preferred to
be billed on the basis of "time and results combined," and only 2% preferred to be billed "based on responsibility and results achieved." Id. The

results of this survey indicate that large corporations who employ outside
counsel are beginning to insist that attorneys utilize itemized billing procedures, as opposed to the lump sum billing which had been prevalent in the
past.
307. Given the fact that attorneys collect expense information for purposes of reducing their gross income for federal tax purposes, see note 294
supra, it is difficult to believe that attorneys do not consider such information in their billing determinations.

308. See notes 39-40 supra.
309. The following legal services organizations filed briefs as amici curiae in Copeland:
National Lawyer's Committee For Civil Rights Under Law; Washington

Lawyers' Committee; American Civil Liberties Union; Center For Auto

Safety; Center For Law In The Public Interest; Center For Law and Social Policy; Children's Defense Fund; Citizens Communications Center;
Council For Public Interest Law; Environmental Defense Fund; Equal
Rights Advocates; Institute For Public Representation; Media Access
Project; Mental Health Law Project; National Conference of Black Lawyers; National Employment Law Project; National Prison Project of the
ACLU Foundation, Inc.; National Veterans Law Center; National Wildlife Federation; Public Advocates; Puerto Rican Legal Defense And Education Fund, Inc.; Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc.; Washington
Council of Lawyers; Women's Legal Defense Fund.
Brief As Amici Curiae In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees' Motion For Re-
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of the cost plus formula could decrease the gross sums available
to the legal services organization community under statutes
such as section 1988, because their overhead and salary expenditures are less than those encountered by private practitioners.

31 0

The Copeland panel, on denial of rehearing, responded to
this argument by stating:
They will be guaranteed a reasonable profit above their actual
costs. We are not aware that public interest and civil rights firms
usually receive more than this. However, the trial court couldand, in our view, should-evaluate the special skills which a public
interest or civil rights firm may bring to bear among the other quality factors which
the court applies to the actual cost plus reasonable
3 11
profit figures.

This statement underscores a crucial observation of the purpose
of the fee shifting provisions of civil rights statutes such as section 1988. Legal services organizations, along with their counterparts in private practice, are not entitled to anything more than
a reasonable fee under section 1988.312 The responsibility for
providing monetary support for such organizations lies with
Congress, not the judiciary. 3 13 Section 1988 was not enacted to
provide funding for legal services organizations, and courts simply are not at liberty to bolster the resources of these organizations through excessive awards of section 1988 fees. 3 14 That
statute was not passed to benefit attorneys, whether employed
3 15
in private practice or by legal services organizations.
Additionally, the utilization of the cost plus formula would
not necessarily reduce the total amount of attorneys' fees collected by the legal services organizational community. A prominent federally funded legal services organization based in
Chicago currently encounters overhead and salary expenses
which exceed $30 per hour of attorney time. 316 An award of a 50
hearing And Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc, Copeland v. Marshall, 594
F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated, 48 U.S.L.W. 2017 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1979)
(rehearing en banc ordered).
310. See briefs cited in note 309 supra.
311. 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,038, at 11,220 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1979) (emphasis in original).
312. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
313. Chicago Daily L. Bull., Aug. 21, 1979, at 3 (appropriations for fiscal
1980 toward funding of legal services organizations amounted to 300 million
dollars).
314. Nothing in the legislative history indicates such an intent. See note
27 and accompanying text supra.
315. See Page v. Preisser, 468 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
316. Such information may be obtained through the Freedom of Information Act provisions of the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996h
(Supp. 1979), codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1602 (1978). Under these provisions, the
audits required by Legal Services Corporation: Audit and Accounting
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percent return of profit on these expenses would yield a rate of
recovery of $45 per hour. Such an award would be roughly
equivalent to rates currently awarded legal services organizations under section 1988.317
Even if it is assumed that attorneys' fee awards to organizational counsel would be smaller under cost plus than corresponding fee awards to attorneys in private practice, the
legislative history of section 1988 does not preclude utilization of
the formula. The Senate and House reports cite four cases dealing with the right of legal services organizations to judicial
awards of attorneys' fees. 318 The case cited by the Senate Report, Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 319 indicated that courts
should not reduce an otherwise reasonable award of attorneys'
fees simply because counsel happened to be employed by a legal services organization. 320 The Davis court went on to hold
that the calculation of an award of attorneys' fees to organizational counsel would be "computed in the traditional manner. ' 321 This holding would not preclude judicial application of
"cost plus" so long as that formula was similarly applied to determine the measure of fees awarded to private as well as orga322
nizational counsel.
The House Report cites three cases dealing with awards of
attorneys' fees to organizational counsel. 323 Fairley v. Patterson 324 is in accord with the Davis holding. In Fairley, the district court arbitrarily refused to grant attorneys' fees to
prevailing counsel because the award would have accrued to a
tax exempt foundation which funded plaintiff's counsel during
the litigation. 325 The court of appeals held that "allowable fees
Guide For Recipients And Auditors, 41 Fed. Reg. 29958, July 20, 1976, (ch. 5,
§ 1), can be obtained.
317. See fee rate table in note 234 supra.

318. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 n.16 (1976); S. REP. No. 1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin [19761 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS 5908,

5913.
319. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
320. Id. at 5047-48.
321. Id. In Davis,the court awarded a fee which was in excess of market
levels for that locality. The fee was justified by the qualifications of the attorney and the excellent results obtained by the litigation. Nothing would
preclude equivalent awards under the cost plus formula, provided the fee
claiming attorney performed with the requisite skill and achieved similar
results for his client.
322. Davis clearly warns against the use of such a double standard. Fees
to organizational and private attorneys should be calculated under the
same procedures. Id.
323. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 n.16 (1976).
324. 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974).
325. The district court in Fairley declined to award fees to successful organizational counsel for the declared reason that "[any award made . . .
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and expenses may not be reduced because [the plaintiff's] attorney was employed or funded by a civil rights organization
and/or tax exempt foundation. '326 The Fairley court did not address the issue of the appropriate fee size to organizational
counsel.

327

The remaining cases cited by the House Report, Torres v.
329
Sachs,328 and IncarceratedMen of Allen County Jail v. Fair,
also held that the employment status of counsel for the plaintiff
is not an appropriate factor to consider when determining an
award of attorneys' fees. 33 0 However, these two courts apparently reached conflicting conclusions on the issue of the reasonable size of the fee awarded to organizational counsel. In Torres,
the Second Circuit implied that attorneys' fee awards to organi331
zational counsel should be keyed to prevailing market rates.
The Tor-es court awarded organizational counsel a rate of $75
per hour.332 In IncarceratedMen, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an
award of attorneys' fees to organizational counsel, without hint33 3
ing that the $15 per hour figure was inappropriate.
The wide disparity in the rate of recovery approved by these
two courts precludes reliable determination of legislative intent
regarding the measure of "reasonable" fees to which organizational counsel are entitled. Congressional intent can be elicited
only by reference to the common holding of the four cases.
First, each case holds that organizational counsel are entitled to
awards of attorneys' fees under section 1988. 334 Second, all four
opinions note that district courts may not arbitrarily reduce
otherwise reasonable awards of attorneys' fees merely because
counsel for the plaintiff happened to be employed by a legal
will be directly chanelled into the coffers of the Ford Foundation which enjoys its own reward at public expense by its tax exemption status." Id. at
605.
326. Id. at 606.
327. This issue was not before the court of appeals because no award of
fees had been granted by the district court.
328. 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
329. 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974).
330. See 538 F.2d at 13; 507 F.2d at 286.
331. The Torres court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs counsel
were entitled to something "less than the going rates" for legal services because such counsel were employed by a publicly funded legal services organization. 538 F.2d at 11-12.
332. Id.
333. The lower court's opinion in IncarceratedMen was vacated by the
Sixth Circuit on the issue of apportionment of the fee to be paid. The issue
of whether the fee awarded was appropriate was not addressed.
334. Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Incarcerated Men of
Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 9444, at 5048-49 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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services organization. 335 The cost plus formula is consistent
with these rules.
Theoretically, a trial court employing "cost plus" should
award identical returns of profit to similarly skilled private and
organizational counsel. 336 Requiring district courts to award
identical gross fees to private and organizational counsel,
notwithstanding the greater litigation expenses incurred by private counsel, would effectively award a higher return of profit to
organizational counsel.3 37 Such a rule would lead a court to arbitrarily increase an otherwise reasonable award of attorneys'
fees simply because plaintiff's counsel happened to be employed by a legal services organization. 338 This outcome would
be inconsistent with the spirit of "reasonableness" which is the
heart of section 1988.
On balance, employment of the cost plus formula would be
consistent with the legislative history and policy goals of section
1988. The objective framework it provides for attorneys' fee
award calculations is certainly preferable to the subjective, unreviewable procedures currently in use. 339 Cost plus guarantees

that legal services organizations and private attorneys will receive reimbursement for their expenses, along with a reasonable return of profit. Legal services organizations should not
and cannot reasonably expect more.
CONCLUSION

After viewing the differing constructions and applications of
the Johnson factors, the need for adoption of the "cost plus"
formula by federal courts should become apparent. The twelve
335. Id.

336. The gross fees awarded would be different. Nonetheless, a district
court should, under cost plus, award similarly situated private and organizational counsel an indentical rate of profit return on the costs expended.

337. If, in fact, the expenses of a legal services organization are less than
those encountered in private practice, as those organizations appear to
claim, see note 310 and accompanying text supra, then a standard which
would require the award of equivalent gross fees to both private and organi-

zational attorneys would, in actuality, award a higher rate of profit to the
organization. If the expenses incurred by legal services organizations
amount to $30 per hour, see note 316 and accompanying text supra, and the

corresonding expense to private practitioners is $40 per hour, then an award
of 50% profit to each under "cost plus" would yield gross awards of $45 per
hour and $60 per hour accordingly. If a court was required to award $60 per
hour to organizational counsel, such counsel would receive a 100% return
on their expenses-compared with the 50% profit return to the private practitioner.
338. This is simply the inverse of the holding of the four cases cited by
the legislative history of section 1988. See note 334 and accompanying text
supra.
339. See note 232 and accompanying text supra.
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subjectively applied "factors" may mean something different to
each particular judge. This system cannot provide a consistent,
uniformly just manner of apportioning the cost of civil rights litigation.
Of course, subjective use of the Johnson factors will continue under the cost plus formula. 340 But at least cost plus provides objective boundaries within which courts can rationally
exercise their discretion in applying the Johnson factors. Cost
plus should aid a district court judge in his efforts to award reasonable fees under section 1988. Controlling the discretionary
awarding of fees is an implicit element of the cost plus formula.
Under cost plus, an award of attorneys' fees which does not
cover the documented expenses of the fee claiming attorney
would be subject to effective review. 341 In addition, the reviewing courts could accord closer, more meaningful scrutiny to excessive fee awards.
Legal fees are set in the open market by arms-length attorney/client agreement, often with an eye toward maintaining an
attorney/client relationship. A section 1988 fee, however, is imposed upon an individual who stands in an adversarialrelationship with the fee-claiming attorney. Moral guidelines imposed
by professional responsibility are apparently the only force
which may induce a fee-claiming attorney to exercise billing
342
judgment when seeking a section 1988 fee.
As the cost of legal services skyrockets, the issue of the nature and limits of "reasonable" section 1988 fee awards has assumed growing importance in our legal system. The role of the
court as an arbiter of attorneys' fee award requests is undoubt340. Courts may subjectively apply the Johnson factors to determine "return of profit" under the cost plus formula. See note 266 and accompanying
text supra.
341. Under cost plus, the record of trial court proceedings would contain
evidence of the fee claiming attorney's base expenses attributable to the
litigation. Such record would permit effective appellate review of the adequacy of section 1988 fee awards which do not reimburse an attorney for his
expenses or provide little profit compensation.
342. The original Copeland panel, on denial of rehearing, quoted the following passage from the memorandum of the Attorney General:
More refined analysis and consideration of alternatives are required.
When representing a private client, attorneys must exercise billing
judgment; they must consider the labor expended in view of the result
to be achieved. This economic judgment is absent when the federal
treasury is footing the bill. Other solutions must be explored. This is
what the panel has wisely suggested.
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 30,038, at 11,224. This observation has equal application to section 1988 fees imposed against private defendants with "deep
pockets."
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edly a "difficult and sometimes distasteful task. ' 343 The fact remains, however, that the courts are bound to undertake this task
and should strive to exercise their duties in a fair, rational manner.
If nothing else, Copeland v. Marshall spotlights the need for
alteration of present procedures governing attorneys' fee award
determinations. As noted by that court, when a law firm claims
$206,000 and is awarded $160,000 on a case which yields $31,343 in
monetary benefits to the plaintiffs, "a prima facie case that
something is wrong" with the status quo is formed.344 Cost plus

may well inject a measure of rationality into present fee award
determination procedures. The formula appears to be both logically and economically sound. As such, the cost plus formula
should at least be considered by courts in their fee award determinations. In the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants,
and the dignity of the legal profession, cost plus should be employed to remedy the unpredictable, unreviewable procedures
which presently govern the determination of a "reasonable" section 1988 fee.
Bruce Charles Dopke

343. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir.
1974).
344. Copeland v. Marshall, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 30,038, at 11,222 (D.C. Cir.
June 29, 1979) (on denial of rehearing, emphasis in original).

